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ABSTRACT

Cybersecurity’s role is to protect confidentiality, integrity, and availability of enterprise assets.
Confidentiality secures data from theft, integrity mitigates modification of data in a malicious way,
and availability assures continuation of systems’ access and services. However, achieving these
goals is difficult due to the mushrooming of various cyber attackers that come from individuals
or state actors with motives ranging from ideological, financial, state-sponsored espionage,
revenge, or simple curiosity and boredom. The difficulty also lies in the complexity of the cyber
layers that are not well studied. Layers that interconnect and require effective communication and
collaboration. This effectiveness is still lacking in cyber programs. To understand this complexity,
one must seek an interdisciplinary approach to cybersecurity. Interdisciplinary study requires
understanding of technology, mathematics, engineering, psychology, economics, human factors,
and political science. Hence, this dissertation is proposing an Interdisciplinary Cybersecurity for
Resilient Cyberdefense or ICRC model that includes (1) building behavioral aspects of
cybersecurity with insider threat insights, (2) mastering encryption standards and requirements
through developing a novel encryption method, (3) understanding different cyberdefense
strategies’ costs and payoffs by using game theory, (4) assessing vulnerabilities in the networks
and plan ethical hacking in an audit, (5) studying machine learning challenges in cybersecurity to
improve tools and set new ontologies for different threats, including the insider threat risk, and
(6) address trustworthiness by aligning overall requirements of cybersecurity.
ICRC is more than the sum of the above parts, it is a new approach for cybersecurity professionals
to consider expanding their expertise to be interdisciplinary. Since cybersecurity is a complex task
it requires a team that can handle its complexity. However, a given team’s structure, team’s hierarchy, and team members’ characteristics could affect negatively that team’s performance.
With executing ICRC, both the team and the individuals seek interdisciplinary approaches to
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contribute to enterprise’s resilience.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Cybersecurity combines a set of strategies and systems to defend and protect confidentiality, integrity and availability of data (CIA triad), systems and services. It is complex because it consists
of various elements and layers such as networks, systems, hosts, people, privacy, etc. Today’s
necessity for systems and data to be available digitally and accessible online increases bad actors’
persistent attempts to breach them. Hence, cyber defenders must be prepared with training, tools,
policies and strategies to face attacks that can come from outside or inside the security perimeters.
They also need to capitalize on the latest research in cybersecurity as it is growing. Attackers’
motives are numerous, and they change their payloads and attack vectors which makes predicting
all of them a serious task.
The continuing success of cyber incidents against various institutions show that there is a need for
a different approach to cybersecurity. An approach that is interdisciplinary and its professionals
(teams and individuals) are equipped with expertise in different fields. For this purpose, this dissertation is proposing an Interdisciplinary Cybersecurity for Resilient as Cyberdefense or ICRC
to research various connected areas instead of the traditional approach of solving one problem or
solving different problems in the same specialty. The goal is to show that for cybersecurity teams,
to be resilient they should adopt and tailor ICRC or similar models. The rationale behind it is
that malicious attackers are individuals or teams that function in certain ways that do not follow
the same structure and hierarchy as the cyberdefense teams. They often vary their strategies and
learn new skills or explore new fields i n o rder t o b e s uccessful. H ackers s hare a ssets w ith each
other and educate each other on techniques of hacking or provide tutorials or code sources. Unlike
cybersecurity teams that are either too busy or understaffed or stressed during decision making or
must follow a hierarchy on interactions and limitations on sharing.
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The Definition of a Resilient Cyberdefense

First, we like to adopt a definition of a Resilient Cyberdefense, definitions of selected components
are taken from [54, 145] and explained:

• Resilience is “the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and
recover rapidly from disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover
from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents.” [54] (Based
on PPD 21)
• Information System Resilience is “the ability of an information system to continue to: (i)
operate under adverse conditions or stress, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, while
maintaining essential operational capabilities; and (ii) recover to an effective operational
posture in a time frame consistent with mission needs.” [54] (Based on NIST SP 800-39)
• Network Resilience is “a computing infrastructure that provides continuous business operation (i.e., highly resistant to disruption and able to operate in a degraded mode if damaged),
rapid recovery if failure does occur, and the ability to scale to meet rapid or unpredictable
demands.” [54]
• Operational Resilience is “ the ability of systems to resist, absorb, and recover from or adapt
to an adverse occurrence during operation that may cause harm, destruction, or loss of ability
to perform mission-related functions.” [54] (Based on Source: DoDI 8500.01)

Hence, the adopted Resilient Cyberdefense definition here is “the ability to withstand CIA triad
threats or attacks that are unintentional or whose interests may be guided by insider actors or by
outside security perimeter hackers. It is shaped in a set of requirements that daily security operations depend on to adapt in case of adverse incidents or errors to protect enterprise’s mission
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and reputation. Resilient cyberdefense includes the ability to recover and maintain survivability of
systems to an acceptable degree.”
This adopted definition makes resilience both an iterative process and a product. Resilience requires defeating a widely accepted misconception that cybersecurity is a technology issue. As
explained in Chapter 1, the weakest link in cybersecurity is the Human and the majority of cyber
incidents are human enabled. A good example is: the Department of Defense (DoD) adopted the
term cybersecurity in 2019 based on National Security Presidential Directive-54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-23: “cybersecurity means prevention of damage to, protection of, and
restoration of computers, electronic communications systems, electronic communication services,
wire communication, and electronic communication, including information contained therein, to
ensure its availability integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.” To be used
throughout DoD instead of the term information assurance (IA) [52, 95].

ICRC Components and Motivations

ICRC is summarized in Figure 1.1. The main components include behavioral aspects and insider
threats, encryption, game theory, trustworthiness, machine learning, and vulnerability assessment.
The motivations behind the components are:
Behavioral aspects and insider threat in Chapter 2: A paradigm shift is essential to the effectiveness of current techniques and practices in cybersecurity. Since the majority of cyber incidents
are human enabled, this shift requires expanding research to underexplored areas such as behavioral aspects of cybersecurity. It is more vital to focus on social and behavioral issues to improve
the current situation. This chapter proposes (Unintentional-Intentional-Malicious) UIM human error as insider-anomaly concept; reviews behavior, social and crime theories along with weapons
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Figure 1.1: ICRC components

of influence; and includes an interdisciplinary framework that combines behavioral cybersecurity,
human factors, and modeling and simulation.

Encryption in Chapter 3: Encryption is the process of using an algorithm to transform information to make it unreadable for unauthorized users. Cryptography plays a major role in achieving
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securing data storage and communication. The motivation from this chapter is to research an innovative encryption method to show that encryption must pass several tests to be acceptable. The
studied method is a new, fast and secure RGB (Red-Green-Blue) image encryption using Generalized Heat Equation (GHE) associated with Generalized Vigenère-type Table over Symmetric
Group Sn (GVTSG). Encryption keys are obtained from Random Key Sequence (RKS). We have
generated RKS and GVTSG with the help of GHE. Randomness over the generated key sequence
by applying the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) statistical test suite. A formula for the keyspace has also been obtained, and it is shown that this keyspace resists brute force
attack. The proposed encryption algorithm provides high security and a larger key space. Robustness of the proposed algorithm has been analyzed and compared with other competing algorithms
which exist in the literature.

Vulnerability assessment in Chapter 4: The network infrastructure is the most critical technical
asset of any organization. This network architecture must be useful, efficient and secure. However,
the security challenges are immense and cyber professionals have to have good understanding and
awareness to the risks, the vulnerabilities, and the tools to assess them. The challenges remain
in integrating the vulnerability analysis tools in a holistic process that cyber defenders can use to
detect an intrusion and respond quickly. Attack graphs are discussed as an important method to
analyze network security.
A game theory strategy in Chapter 5: Game theory is not widely adopted in the field of cybersecurity. It is included in ICRC because it has potential to identify payoffs and strategies and
contribute to resilient cyberdefense. In this chapter, a model of interaction between the defender
and the attacker as an incomplete stochastic game is studied. A model that efficiently activates the
defending mechanism of a resource constraint network where activation of the defending system
otherwise consumes a significant amount of resources is articulated. The model is designed so that
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it executes the activation of the defending system only when it is needed. It is a standard practice
in this literature that the defender has incomplete information about the attacker’s strategy. As
the resource is limited for the defender, there is a need to learn the behavior of the attacker to
identify a malicious network agents. Triggered by the lack of unavailability of information about
the attacker’s action, the attacker leverages the information asymmetry to misinform and misled
any defense system. A learning algorithm for an incomplete information game to update the strategy for playing the game is developed. The results show that it converges and leads to a Nash
equilibrium.
Machine learning in Chapter 6: Cybersecurity challenges are increasing in complexity and intensity. There is a need for cybersecurity to evolve and allow cyber defenders to win against hackers’
ever-changing attacks. The latest advances in artificial intelligence bring an optimistic view to use
different methods such as the machine learning algorithms. However, many of those methods lack
accuracy and their security is not well studied. They handle huge volumes of data of different types
and they can be vulnerable to cyber attacks. Moreover, the perpetrators are also interested in using
machine learning techniques. This chapter provides a detailed review for both opportunities and
challenges of machine learning algorithms. The motivation is for cybersecurity professionals to be
able to assess tools that use machine learning and conduct or support research of new ontologies
that deal with ever changing threats such as the insider threat and malware.
Cybersecurity trustworthiness in Chapter 7: The motivation behind this chapter is to address the
issue that weakens cybersecurity trustworthiness which is due to misalignment or lack of alignment
of policies, risks management framework and a resilient cybersecurity program. Security by obscurity is no longer a strategy to mitigate the risks. The selected topic is robotics. We are seeing an
increase demand and deployment of such techniques to daily life tasks, industries, transportation,
humanitarian missions and wars; and surely incidents involving compromised robotics are going
to be uncovered. Incidents of malicious attacks on unmanned aerial vehicles are already recorded.
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There is no doubt that robotics providers are either lacking comprehensive cybersecurity risk Management framework and policy or do not communicate them with stakeholders. Moreover, many
robots operating systems are open source and one can use reconnaissance and scanning methods
to identify them. Hence, (as takeaway) there is a need to pause in rushing to build systems (e.g.
robots) without consideration of future cyber challenges. The situation of existing vulnerabilities
in systems and processes could add mistrust to already noticed concerns. A neutral cybersecurity
plan that any robotics provider can adopt and tailor has its details based on its own controls and
capabilities. This aspect is carefully articulated.

The Conclusion and the future work are discussed in Chapter 8. The future work will continue the
study of the gray nodes in Figure 1.1 under a human-centered research that is interdisciplinary.
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CHAPTER 2: BEHAVIORAL ASPECTS OF CYBERSECURITY WITH
INSIDER THREAT

Introduction

Stories of cyber attacks are becoming a routine in which cyber attackers show new levels of intention by sophisticated attacks on networks. Unfortunately, cybercriminals have figured out profitable business models and they take advantage of the online anonymity. A serious situation that
needs to improve for networks’ defenders. Therefore, a paradigm shift is essential to the effectiveness of current techniques and practices. Since the majority of cyber incidents are human enabled,
this shift requires expanding research to underexplored areas such as behavioral aspects of cybersecurity. It is more vital to focus on social and behavioral issues to improve the current situation.
This paper is an effort to provide a review of relevant theories and principles, and gives insights
including an interdisciplinary framework that combines behavioral cybersecurity, human factors,
and modeling and simulation.

Gary Warner delivered in March 1, 2014, a TEDX Birmingham presentation about our current
approach to cybercrime. Warner, the Director of the Center for Information Assurance and Joint
Forensics Research, at the University of Alabama, Birmingham, explained the challenges of protecting individuals and reporting cybercrimes. Benefits of making money and conducting low risk
illegal acts drive cybercriminals. The Internet Security Threat Report [205] shows that the average
ransom was $373 in 2014 and it was $294 in 2015. It jumped to $1077 in 2016, and we surmise
that it is due to the upsurge value of Bitcoin. A digital currency preferred by ransomware criminals because they can accept it globally without having to reveal their identities. The same report
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shows that the number of detection of ransomware increased to 463,841, in 2016; and more than
7.1 billion identities have been compromised in cyber attacks in the last 8 years. Malware attacks
are on the rise, for instance, the recurrence of disk wiping malware (Shamoon) in the Middle East,
and cyber attacks against Ukrainian targets involving the KillDisk Trojan. To show a historical
damage that such malware can do, we give the example of the Ukranian power grid that suffered
a cyber attack in December 2015. It caused an outage of around 225,000 customers. A modified
KillDisk was used to delete the master boot record and logs of targeted systems’ organizations;
consequently, it was used in stage two to amplify attacks by wiping off workstations, servers, and a
Human Machine Interface card inside of a Remote Terminal Unit. Trojan Horse viruses are considered the third wave of malware that spreads across the Internet via malicious websites and emails
[53]. There is no doubt that breaches of data are one of the most damaging cyber attacks [229].
Figure 2.1 depicts three main cyber targets, or their combination based on the work discussed in
[53]. They are usually referred to as CIA triad:

Figure 2.1: Losses caused by cyber threats, modified based on [53]

• Confidentiality threat (Data Theft) that can target databases, backups, application servers,
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and system administrators.
• Integrity threat (Alter Data) includes hijacking, changing financial data, stealing large amounts
of money, reroute direct deposit, and damage of organization image.
• Availability attacks (Denial Access) can be Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), targeted
denial of service, and physical destruction.

Attackers will try to penetrate all levels of security defense system after they access the first level
in the network. Therefore, the defender should be more motivated to analyze security at all levels
using tools to find out vulnerabilities before the attackers do [113]. The 2018 Black Report pays
particular attention to the period it takes intruders to hack organization’s cyber system, both by
stages of the breach and by industry. The clear majority of respondents say that they can gain
access to an organization’s system, to map and detect valuable data, to compromise it within 15
hours. Now, most industry reports say the average gap between a breach and its discovery is
between 200 and 300 days [173].
It is clear that cyber offenders or criminals still have an advantage over cyber defenders. Therefore, what are the deficiencies in current research and what areas need immediate attention or
improvement? Thomas Holt at Michigan State University’s School of Criminal Justice argues that
it is essential to situate a cybercrime threat in a multidisciplinary context [93]. Hence, based on
literature review described in Section (Related Work), we believe that the behavioral side of cybersecurity needs more research and can improve faster if it is integrated with human factors, and
benefit from sophisticated modeling and simulation techniques. Our study emphasizes two necessary points:
(1) Interdisciplinary approach to cybersecurity is essential and it should be defined based on cyberspace understanding. We adopt a definition by the International Organization for Standardization of cyberspace, “the complex environment resulting from the interaction of people, software
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and services on the Internet by means of technology devices and networks connected to it, which
does not exist in any physical form [14].” This definition presents the cyberspace as a complex
environment and initiates the interactions with people. Consequently, people’s biases and behaviors influence the interactions with software and technology, which affect the cyberspace. We
believe that advancing this interdisciplinary research could bring more relevance and increase of
cybercrimes’ manuscripts in top-tier journals. It is noticed that a low number of cyber-dependent
crime manuscripts is due to a low number of criminologists who study cybercrime [168]. Thus, we
address several behavioral and crime theories. Based on the proposed interdisciplinary approach,
cyber teams have to include individuals with different backgrounds ranging from IT, criminology,
psychology, and human factors.
(2) Enterprises must account for possibility of vulnerabilities including human error in the design
of systems. Avoiding a vulnerability is a much better option than trying to patch it, or spend resources in guarding it. This may sound as a trivial proposition yet, in reality, many defenders and
users often deal with security as a secondary task when their primary function is not security. The
authors in [169] stated that security is barely the primary task of those who use the information infrastructure. Also, system developers focus on the user’s needs before integrating security into an
architecture design. Afterwards, they add security tools that are easy to incorporate or meet some
other system requirements. This is our rationale behind making modeling and simulation an essential component. The stakeholders such as users, managers, and developers, should be involved in
building those models, and determine simulations that evaluate cognitive loads and response times
to threats. Stakeholders can also use simulation to exercise real life scenarios of social engineering
attacks. Furthermore, accounting for vulnerabilities may be affected by the budget. Enterprises
keep cybersecurity’s budget to a minimum. A report by [75] found that financial institutions’ on
the average spending on cybersecurity is 10% of their IT spending or an average of 0.3% of revenue. Recently, some companies are spending more on cyber defense but in areas that may not
maximize security. The report of [25] found that organizations are spending more on security but
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not wisely. This so called reactive security spending and results in widespread inefficiency. By all
means, this status increases the complexity of the security problem. Therefore, the perceptions of
various industries about their cybersecurity needs vary, in most cases, they lack.

Related Work

We conducted a comprehensive literature review using different criteria to capture both a historical
stand point and the latest findings. We started the search of theories, human factors, and decision making strategies from 1980. It is important to acknowledge their historical contributions
and explore how they can be applied to cybercrimes. We started the search of cybercrime reports
from 2014 to understand cybercrime trends and magnitudes. The search of other subjects such as
insider threat, hacking, information security, cyber programs, etc. is from the past decade. Some
of the search commands: (cybersecurity AND human factors), (cybersecurity AND behavioral
aspects), (cybersecurity AND modeling and simulation), (interdisciplinary approach and cybersecurity), (cybersecurity AND crime theories). Some of the databases that were searched are
EBSCO, IEEE Xplore, JSTOR, Science Direct, and Google Scholar. It is worthwhile to note that
several search results that include interdisciplinary cybersecurity awareness are about educational
undergraduate students. This explains the urgency in educating future cyber professionals who will
work in interdisciplinary cyber teams. We observed in recent conferences that few speakers debate
whether there is talent’s shortage or the problem is inadequate use of available tools. Nevertheless,
our view is that the problem could be both. The two points mentioned in introduction (interdisciplinary approach and vulnerability in design) are used as criterion to decide related articles cited
here.
It is acknowledged that human as the end user can be a critical backdoor into the network [5].
The research done by [4] used behavioral science approach to determine the factors shaping cy-
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bersecurity behavioral decisions of users. The results suggest that security perceptions and general
external factors affect individual cybersecurity adoptive behavior, and those factors are regulated
by users traits (gender, age) and working environment. The authors in [133] conducted an interdisciplinary review reiterating that several criminological theories provide important frameworks that
guide empirical investigations of different junctures within the cyber-dependent crime ecosystem.
Also, they found that more research is needed and suspect that criminologists may not still bring
cybercrime scholarship to the forefront of the criminological area. The authors in [168] found that
the most popular criminological explanations of cyber crime include learning theory, self-control
theory, neutralization theory, and routine activities theory. In general, their finding reinforce the
fact that integration of cybersecurity into criminal justice is not fast, probably because a few criminologists study cybercrimes. The work in [169] addresses the importance of involving human
behavior when designing and building cyber technology. They presented two topics of behavioral
aspects: (1) cognitive load that can contribute to inattentional blindness that prevents a team member to notice unexpected events when focusing on a primary task, and (2) biases that could help
security designers and developers to anticipate perceptions and account for them in the designs.
We will articulate more related work in the components’ sections of the proposed framework.
In summary, research has been consistent in acknowledging that behavioral aspects are still underexplored and the focus is more on the technology aspect. One of the challenges is the complexity
of the models when addressing different theories. Our aim is to provide insights on current issues,
for example, classifying insider threat under human error makes insider issue a design requirement. This insight makes our approach significant because it opens channels to use the best human
factors practices found in healthcare, aviation and the chemical industry. It reinforces the idea of
insider as a design requirement (prevention).
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Interdisciplinary Framework

Because all partial solutions ( Firewall, IDS/IPS, netflow, proxy, mail gateway, etc.) do not add
up to a complete solution and the offenders still have the most latitude for variation at the network
level [105], it is necessary to invest in interdisciplinary frameworks. In this Section, we propose an
interdisciplinary framework that enables understanding of interconnectivity of relations and should
serve as a background to improve research and maturity of security programs. We focus on three
areas based on the work of [36], depicted in a Venn diagram in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2: Venn diagram for the interdisciplinary framework, based on [36]

• Behavioral cybersecurity is the main focus of our study. We address profiles and methods
of hackers, insiders, behavioral, social, and crime theories. Weapons of influence that are
largely used by the offenders and mostly ignored by the defenders will also be identified.
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• Integrate human factors discipline with behavioral cybersecurity. We give an insight on human factors that trigger human error. If we consider the insider problem as a human error,
we can mitigate the risks by improving the environment, and plan it in the design requirement of future systems. The assumption is that system design enables insider risk because
of the already existing vulnerabilities or conditions. The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) recommends that the best method to involve everybody is to motivate everyone using incentives within the cyber economy [4]. Hence, it is worth integrating human
factors to improve working environment, mitigate risks, and make the system’s probability
of failure lower.
• Using Modeling and simulation for researching, developing and implementing new techniques, tools and strategies is our recommendation. Modeling and simulation are useful for
many reasons and can be extended to situations such as when real experimentation is not
convenient, or dangerous, or not cost effective [148]. Simulation can test applications of
human factors, for example, whether the real process may cause a cognitive load that will
inhibit the security end-user to miss important information or threats. We review modeling
and simulation in literature, and we provide insight in that Section, based on our focus on
human error.

There is no doubt that behavioral cybersecurity is important, and it needs more research. We
emphasize the three components of this proposed interdisciplinary framework because human performance is not affected solely by training, which is the main focus of cyber defenders. It is
affected by the system itself, people’s biases, environment workload, administrative management,
communication practices, human-computer interfaces, existing distractions, etc. Many factors still
contribute to the slow research and implementation of interdisciplinary approaches. Unfortunately,
many enterprises underestimate the severity of cyber incidents, or they pass the blame to one person when an incident occurs. For instance, Federal Trade Commission website reports that in
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September of 2017, Equifax announced a data breach that exposed the personal information of
147 million people and Equifax has agreed to a global settlement with the Federal Trade Commission, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and 50 U.S. states and territories. The settlement
includes up to $425 million to help people affected by the data breach [76]. Yet, the settlement
does little to those who file claims ($125 one time payout or credit monitoring for a number of
years). Individuals cannot opt out of Equifax being their data steward which makes many persons
nervous. Most of the online reports state that Equifax did not update a known vulnerability in the
Apache Struts web-application software. Nevertheless, Equifax’s Chief Executive told members of
Congress on October 3, 2017, that the massive breach happened because of a mistake by a single
employee.

Behavioral Cybersecurity

Cybercrime Offenders: Hackers

Hackers’ Techniques

A hacker is a human that uses technical intellect to get unauthorized access to data to modify it,
delete it or sell it by any means [161]. Although a hacker may follow various steps to execute a successful attack, a usual network intrusion involves reconnaissance to collect information, scanning
to set up a vulnerability profile, gaining access or penetrating an access point or level, maintaining
access by accessing other levels or planting programs to keep access, and covering tracks to hide
the trails [113]. The authors in [190] have surveyed hacking techniques:

• The dictionary attack to crack vulnerable passwords. This is like brute force to defeat security. It takes advantage of users not being able to remember difficult passwords or the ones
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that do not make any sense so they use relevant or easy passwords. Often hackers find those
users who adopt weak passwords such as 123456 or password. Currently, companies are
enhancing passwords’ syntax and mandate specific changing procedures. Yet, users still use
same passwords across websites.
• Structured Query Language (SQL) injection of harmful code to modify the SQL query structure. It manipulates website’s database.
• Cross Site Scripting (XSS) is an attack vector that injects malicious scripts into victim’s
webpages.
• Phishing is a social engineering attack in which a phisher fools the user to reveal secret
information. Some examples are discussed in the weapons of influence section (Weapons of
Influence).
• Wireless hacking due to a weakness of some networks. Those networks do not even change
vendor access point and default passwords. A Wi-Fi network can be hacked in wardriving if
it has a vulnerable access point. A hacker uses port scanning and enumeration.
• The Keylogger is a software that runs in the background and captures the user’s key strokes.
With it, hackers can record credentials.

Literature review discusses several hacker profiles. They have various levels of education, they
hold many certificates, and they are either self-employed or work for organizations. Hackers can
be script kiddies who are the new and novice. Their intent is curiosity or notoriety. Cyber-punks
such as virus writers, they have medium skill level and their intent could be notoriety with some
financial gain. Insiders or previously called internals can be driven by many motives such as
revenge or financial benefits. Insider’s skills are usually high. The intent of petty thieves, virus
writers, grey hat or old guard hackers is curiosity or notoriety, but their skill levels are high. The
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motive of professional criminals or black hat hackers can be financial and they hold very high
capabilities. The motive of information warriors who are cyber mercenaries is mainly espionage,
and they are placed under Nation State groups. Political activist or hacktivists are ideologically
motivated, and they manage to include members who posses high level of skills [84].

Insight on Hackers’ Techniques

It is important to understand that hacking techniques and hackers’ motives in order to anticipate
hackers’ moves. All hackers do not think the same way as defenders or in a linear manner. Consequently, defenders need to be interdisciplinary in order to take in account various techniques
and combat. We support this assumption with one of the real stories of exploitation by hackers
that Mitnick and Simon discussed in [137]: Hackers changed firmware in the slot machines after
hiring an insider or a casino employee. Their motive was money and their stimulus was that the
programmers of the machines were human, hence, they most likely had a backdoor flaw in the
programs. One hacker checked the patent office for a code since it was a requirement to include
it for patent filing. The analysis of the code gave away its secret. The pseudo random generator
in the machines was 32-bit random number generator and cracking it was trivial. The designers
of the machine did not want real random number generation so they have some control over the
odds and the game. The hackers in this story were programmers and their thinking was simple
enough to find a sequence of instructions to reach their goal. At that time, casinos spend money in
security guards and not in consulting with security sources. One hacker said that he did not even
feel remorse because they are stealing from casinos who in return steal from people.
Therefore, we present some of the questions that should be answered periodically to predict
hacker’s next move: Is the attack surface defined? Attack surface involves the sum of all the
attack vectors where a hacker can attempt to exploit a vulnerability. What is a critical or a most
vulnerable or a most damaging asset if exploited? How are the access points protected? How can
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hackers access crown jewels? An example of crown jewels is the most valued data. Where crown
jewels are located (servers, network, backups, etc.)? Are the inventories of authorized and unauthorized devices known? Are operating systems well configured and updated? Is a system in place
to identify stolen credentials or compromised user accounts? What type of malware defenses are
used? How effective are training or awareness programs? Are employees aware of social media
risks? How is the situation of employees in the working environment? How effective and robust
are the used intrusion detection systems? Is the reporting system of a potential threat or breach
clear? Is there a plan to combat insider threat? We should highlight that many companies see
that emphasizing prevention increases cost and reduces productivity. The increase of cost is due
to interaction with security control and incident response. Lost of productivity is due to granting
permissions or re-certifying credentials or users’ accounts [53]. We think that they should analyze costs of different options: prevention driven program, incident response driven program, or a
hybrid option.

Cybercrime Offenders: Insiders

Insiders’ Threat

An insider is a hacker from inside the organization; hence, this insider has access rights and is
behind the firewalls. Insider threat is broadly recognized as an issue of highest importance for
cybersecurity management [207]. Several surveys have considered varying aspects of cybersecurity: The SANS Healthcare Cyber Security Survey [68], The Insider Threat Spotlight 2015 Report
[163], Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2014 Information Security Breaches Survey
[49], etc. The Insider Threat Spotlight 2015 Report stated that companies were more concerned
by inadvertent insider threat data leak breaches than malicious data breaches [163]. However,
their concerns do not surely translate to effective changes in cyber programs. According to the
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SANS Healthcare Cyber Security Survey, 51% considered careless insider as a main threat when
it comes to human behavior as an aspect of cybersecurity [68]. Many theories can be applied to
understand insider risk and motives, and can be applied to behavioral models. Often policies and
risk management guidance are geared towards rational cyber-actors while rationalities of users and
defenders represent cyber-system vulnerabilities [69]. Irrational behavior can be dangerous and
unpredictable, it builds on frustration or fury, and it can be motivated by lack of job satisfaction.
Often cyber defenders do not verify irrational behaviors. The authors in [201] have concluded
that end users’ behaviors that occur in organizations could be sited within these behavioral groups
leading to intentional damage, harmful misuse, unsafe tinkering, naive mistakes, mindful assurance, simple hygiene, and using intentionality and technical expertise as criteria. Myers et al. in
[142] have added automated insiders such as bots to unauthorized use of privileges. The authors
in [17] have divided related works into six categories including psychological and social theories,
anomaly based approaches, honeypot based approaches, graph based approaches, game theory
approaches, and motivating studies. The authors in [83] have described a predictive modeling
framework CHAMPION that integrates various data from cyber domain, to analyze psychological, and motivational factors that concern malicious exploitation by the insider. The ontologies in
CHAMPION represent knowledge in the specialized domain to reason about data. The reifiers are
used for the feeding of the ontologies’ primitive data types. The memory is used to store both the
primitive data and the facts concluded by the reasoning system. In addition, the Auto-associative
Memory Columns (AMCs) or reasoning components stacked in a hierarchy and are used for data’s
interpretation and are used to infer new statements. The authors in [34] have discussed the Management and Education of the Risk of Insider Threat (MERIT) models that can be implemented to
communicate insider’s threat. They identified and validated seven observations after analyzing several insider IT sabotage cases. Those observations are insiders had personal predispositions, were
disgruntled employees, were among those who suffered stressful events (sanctions), had behavioral precursors (drug use, aggressive, etc.), created unknown channels to attack after termination,
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or lacked physical and electronic access (exploited insufficient access). A limitation in dealing
with insider threat research is the scarcity of data [203].

Insight on Insiders’ Threat

We think that there is a confusion in classifying insider threat, and many organizations may not
even have policies or controls addressing it. Another issue of concern is that organizations do
not want to admit of having insider incidents, they choose firing the intruder, and protect their
reputation. Our insight considers the insider as a human error to be addressed at the top level of
any developed taxonomy. So we group all user errors and the insider into human error, summarized
in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3: Proposed UIM human error as insider-anomaly concept

For this purpose, we adopt a definition of human error mentioned by the Center for Chemical
Process Safety (AIChE) in [184]:

“Human error is any human action that exceeds some control limit as defined by the
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operating system."

We believe our insight is important because it simplifies this confusing issue to Unintentional Intentional - Malicious or (UIM) instead of several categories. Moreover, it also allows to adopt
lessons learned from industries that have a long history in applying human factors, and built mature
programs. Besides, this insight allows to comprehend that failures happen at the management level,
at the design level, or at the technical expert levels of the company; and they result in human error
or failure [60]. Obviously, UIM category is decided by its consequence or intent:

• Unintentional human error can be due to lack of organized knowledge or operating skills.
This error may remain unintentional or transforms to another type (intentional or malicious).
• Intentional human error is caused by a user who knows of risky behavior but acts on it, or
misuses assets. The wrong action may not necessarily bring a sudden harm to the organization, but it may still breach of existing laws or privacy.
• Malicious human error is the worst error as it is intentional with specific and damaging
consequences in mind.

This classification does not downgrade the insider threat. It brings it upfront in the system design,
similar to human errors that are usually considered at the beginning of designs. It is easier to
blame the human during a cyber incident instead of blaming the cyber program or the design of
the systems. In fact, the system design that did not consider the human factor is also to blame.
Often the user does not see the security policies in the same way as those who wrote them or want
them implemented. It is imperative to realize that users often exhibit their own biases in decision
making [69]. This grouping can also be implemented in user’s training and help make awareness
easier. We give few examples:
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• Unintentional error can happen from using a public Wi-Fi to access important accounts and
not knowing about the risk. Or, while working, employee visits unsafe websites linked from
social media.
• Intentional error can occur if a user writes a password on a sticky note, leaves it near computer or in desk’s drawer and hoping no one else uses it.
• Malicious error can occur with employee stealing confidential data (exfiltration).

As mentioned, a user error can change from a UIM category to another. For example, a user should
not activate links or download attachments in emails without a verification. If a new employee is
not aware of social engineering tactics, the employee may click on those links (unintentional).
This employee’s clicking rate on those link should decrease with training, if not, employee’s action becomes intentional. Similarly, honeypots or decoys can be used to learn about user’s normal
or deviant activities. Some companies implement programs to simulate real life scenarios such as
phishing exercises. We suggest that they are transparent with employees about the use of phishing simulators or other awareness programs. The goal should be to improve the culture of cyber
awareness and not adding stress to workloads.
We previously described the cyber targets (Figure 2.1), and mentioned that the defender should
consider them in the system design that usually inspects requirements. (1) To define confidentiality requirement, the organization should characterize data and its location. The user should
differentiate whether one is dealing with public, confidential, or limited data. Compromising data
may happen on the computer of the user, in transit across an open or close network, on a front-end
server, or in storage [134]. The user’s access to confidential data should be updated if data classification changes or a user’s status changes. Understanding that insider threat as a human error or
anomaly within requirements of data security helps us to set up policies on credentials of persons
who have access to confidential data. For example, to implement Just In Time (JIT) credentials.
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JIT helps to avoid permanent administrator (admin) privileges. It should in return mitigate the risk
to steal admin credentials, and prevent admin data access outside the times in which there is no
need to access confidential data. (2) Integrity is a system requirement. Data may be modified by
the user, in transit across a closed or open network, a front-end server, or in storage [134]. Considering user’s alteration of a system policy as an error helps to best treat integrity like confidentiality.
Hence, the user’s access and impact on system integrity need to be examined. (3) Availability
is also a system requirement. Because system’s components can be interconnected, a user who
affects the availability of a part of a system can affect other parts. User’s error to make a system
unavailable can easily happen intentionally or unintentionally if the system design did not identify
failure points.

Behavior, Social and Crime Theories

Computer scientists, security researchers, psychologists, social scientists have attempted to explain
the behavior of users in relation to cybersecurity. There is insufficient knowledge about the behavior of the user toward information technologies that defend systems and data from troubles such as
malware, spyware, and interruptions [51]. The authors in [83] have emphasized that the only way
to be proactive in the cyber domain is to take behavioral or psycho-social data into account. At this
point, we introduce theories that should help with such issues.

Theories: Normative, Planned Behavior, Social Bond, and Social Cognition

There are questions about rationality when it comes to norms and the study of human cognition.
The norms are essential to the study of informal argumentation, studies of judgment, and decisionmaking. Normative theories are studied in procedural theories forms and epistemic theories forms.
It is difficult to resolve questions about suitable norms for a specific behavior without compre24

hending the origins of normativity [46]. It is recognized that playing a matching game between
a particular behavior and some prescriptive standard is not enough to understand the concept of
normativity. Hence, Corner and Han attempted to answer what makes something normative? It
seems that there is a continuing debate on this subject. Our modest understanding is that a rational
human behavior happens when the behavior matches some criterion, and logic is used to evaluate
arguments. Yet, logic has limitations and may not be appropriate to judge arguments’ strength.
Such limitations of logic encouraged the popularity to Bayesian probability as a calculating application for argument strength [46]. Therefore, the authors make a good argument that the Bayesian
is suitable for the normativity’s requirements.
Another widely used theory is the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) depicted in Figure 2.4. It uses
a predictive model that indicates that subjective norms and attitudes influence behavioral intention.
The latter influences actual behavior. The TPB postulates that people’s behavioral intention is a
good predictor of their real behavior. Another perception of behavior is the subjective norm. The
ease or difficulty of performing behavior is the perceived behavioral control.

Figure 2.4: Theory of Planned Behavior diagram, from [97]

Generally, the greater is the attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control with respect
to a behavior, the higher should be an individual’s intention to demonstrates the behavior under
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consideration. The attitude is connected to beliefs (behavioral, normative and control). In addition,
multiple authors structure social pressure as a cause to normative beliefs. Until now, insufficient
research is done on subjective norms regarding cybersecurity. An area in which TPB can be useful
in the study of insider threat; as TPB is used successfully in predicting several health behaviors
like smoking and substance use. It will be useful to understand the roles of various behavioral
factors and learn which ones will have the highest predictive value in order to integrate it in a
preventive plan, or an intrusion detection system. Similar to the work of Pabian and Vandebosch
that studied cyberbullying using TPB; they found that cyberbullying intention is a predictor of
self-reported cyberbullying behavior after six months [160]. The attitude is the primary direct
predictor of intention followed by the subjective norm. The authors in [51] have integrated TPB
and Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and found that technology awareness is a predictor to
a user behavioral intention to use anti-virus or anti-spyware. Technology awareness had the strong
influence on attitudes toward behavior and behavioral intention. They also found that awareness is
highly correlated with both TPB and TAM beliefs, and recommended that for managers to create
social advocacy groups and networks. Their role is to advocate for cybercrime awareness. The
authors of [31] have used TPB to predict online protective behaviors. Their findings indicate a
significant relationship between a subjective norm and intention. It also emphasizes that external
parties influence the intention of the user to engage in cyber protective behavior.
Social Cognition Theory (SCT) initiated as Social Learning Theory by Albert Bandura and became
SCT in 1986. It postulates that cognitive factors are related to an environment and behavioral
factors. Consequently, learning happens in a social context [89] with reciprocal determinism.
Figure 2.5 depicts SCT basic diagram based on [89]. There is a reciprocal cause and effect between
a person’s behavior and both the social world and personal characteristics. Hence, criminal or
deviant behavior is a learned behavior just like any other behavior. Social Bond Theory makes the
assumption that weaker social bonds can increase the chance of a person to be involved in a crime.
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Figure 2.5: Social Cognition Theory basic diagram

The interesting part of SCT is that it tries to explain the maintenance of behavior, unlike other
theories’ concern of initiating a behavior. SCT can be applied to the cyber domain to investigate
decision support and behavior. It can probably support a robust security framework that studies
practice behaviors of self-users. For example, studying the impact of self-efficacy is a cornerstone
of SCT, on decision and cyber behavior. Self-efficacy is not self-esteem and it is kind of selfevaluation which is significant in individual behavior [89]. Self-efficacy can influence the amount
of effort, self-regulation, initiation of tasks, and handling of obstacles [89]. Also, ill-defined circumstances and performance requirements can bring inconsistencies to self-efficacy expectation
and performance [178].

Theories: General Deterrence, Neutralization, Self-Control, and Situational Crime Prevention

The authors of [207] have summarized criminology theories and security literature. It seems that
all theories involve a motive and one theory is about the opportunity of a crime. Besides, General
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Deterrence Theory is based on a perpetrator committing a crime if the cost of sanction is less than
the benefit of the crime. Hence, stiff punishment and awareness programs deter many potential
perpetrators. Authors in [41] found that employees focus on the perceived benefits of personal
internet use while, at the same time, finding justification for their behavior and keep less attention
to the expected punishment. They are less worried about severity of punishment, and more worried
about the likelihood of being caught. Those users try to justify their deviant behavior as excusable.
This is a topic of neutralization theory. Hence, employees could use neutralization techniques to
justify risky security behaviors. Neutralization is an excellent predictor of employees’ intention to
violate information security policies [195]. They see it as an indicator of a motivational state that
exists just prior to committing an act. Self-control Theory postulates that criminal acts attract low
self-control people as these acts provide pleasure to them. A low self-control individual prefers
immediately gratifying activities that involve risky behaviors, and shows little empathy for others.
Self-control theory’s definition of crime is behaviors that provide momentary or immediate satisfactions and create negative consequences [80]. This theory can be applied to cybercrime and
may be integrated with other stated theories. The theory of Situational Crime Prevention (SCP)
makes the hypothesis that a perpetrator must have an opportunity in addition to a motive. A motive
without an apportunity will not yield to a crime. Hence, it is different because it looks at the opportunities and the formation of motives to excite crimes[207]. SCP framework includes rational
choice, opportunity structure, specificity, and twenty-five techniques to reduce crime found in [74].
The latest studies discussed complex issues in working with SCP, for instance, the competency and
the responsibility to prevent a crime. Consequently, reducing cybercrime spike will depend on involving many parties such as law enforcement, government agencies, security companies, etc.
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Multi-Criteria Decision-Making

We should include Multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) with above theories because conflicting ideas may arise and decisions need to be made to have good programs or models. MCDM
is crucial for several real life problems including cybersecurity. However, the discussion on the
usability of decision theory against cyber threats is limited, which indicates the existence of a gap
[222]. Often, challenges rise during the evaluation of alternatives in terms of a set of deciding measures. There is no doubt that decision making in this chapter’s context cannot be easily modeled
because of dealing with human element and judgement. A wide range of mathematical methods of
MCDM for evaluation and validation of alternatives exist, and embedded in, linear programming,
integer programming, design of experiments, Bayesian networks [222]. MCDM usually involve
three steps when using numerical analysis of the alternatives: (1) identify alternatives to criteria,
(2) attach numerical measures to the criteria and impact of alternatives, and (3) rank each alternative after processing numerical values [211]. The weighted sum model remains the simplest and
the most widely used MCDM method. The authors of [63] have used the analytical hierarchy of
the process for decision making in engineering and found challenges. For instance, when some alternatives are similar or very close to each other, the decision-maker needs to be very careful. They
suggest trying to consider additional decision making criteria to considerably discriminate among
the alternatives. We can assume so far that decision making theories can easily give different answers to the same cybersecurity problem, yet they should be used as tools to back a decision as
the authors of [63] suggested. The authors of [222] have studied two theories in decision making:
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and an Analytical Network Process (ANP). They determined
that a generalized application benchmark framework could be employed to derive a Measure of
Effectiveness (MOE) that relate to the overall operational success criteria (mission performance,
safety, availability, and security). MOEs continuance are measured under specific environmental
and operational conditions, from the users’ viewpoint. The AHP is an appropriate option if a sit29

uation requires rapid and effective decisions due to imminent threat. The ANP is appropriate if
the time constraints are less important, and more far-reaching factors should be considered while
constructing a defensive strategy. Their findings can provide cybersecurity policy makers a way to
quantify the judgments of their technical team regarding cybersecurity policy.
The authors of [102] have added Human Plausible Reasoning Theory (HPR) that is a cognitive
theory to MCDM and provides more reasoning to a user interface. HPR depends on analyzing
people’s answers to ordinary questions about the world. HPR theory assumes dynamic hierarchies
to represent human knowledge. HPR defines parameters of certainty as a set of criteria that should
be taken into account in order to select the best hypothesis. Nevertheless, HPR does not propose
precise mathematical methods for combining these criteria. Indeed, MCDM compliments HPR
and improves control in an intelligent user interface [102].

Weapons of Influence

We owe the credit, for this section’s title, to the first chapter title of Cialdini’s book “Influence The Psychology of Persuasion". Unfortunately, social engineers use weapons to influence and manipulates persons to disclose sensitive information or granting unauthorized access. Cialdini identified six principles of influence that guide human behavior [184]: Reciprocity, scarcity, authority,
consistency, liking and consensus. The authors in [91] have addressed them in their (Persuasive
Advocacy) article. Based on their analysis, we give some examples in which social engineering can
exploit and direct human actions with a view to understanding reason that motivates cybercrime:

• Liking can give a false sense of credibility. Hackers can use it to build rapport, or encourage
certain behaviors by generating fake likes, and artificially increasing the number of followers
on social media to give the impression that other people are supporting that behavior.
• Reciprocity is due to feeling of obligation to return favors. Hackers can offer free services
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or products and expect access or data in return.
• Social proof or consensus summarizes how a person follows other’s lead. Hackers can use
this type of validation to influence users and gain access to data. When people are not certain
they may easily reply to other persons, especially peers.
• Persuasion by peers. Hackers can persuade insiders to steal data for a cause that a peer or a
role model is promoting.
• Individuals who decree expertise or credentials try to harness the power of authority. Authority can bring phony claims and influence a user that is wary of job loss.
• Consistency comes from the need to appear or to remain consistent. Hackers can find out
about consistent actions and use them to distract a user prior to an attack.
• Scarcity of resources makes a user vulnerable. It can influence a user to take an immediate
action without thinking about consequences such as a data breach.

Researchers found that the effectiveness of each one of these principles is due to the victim’s
personality characters. Examples from [212] and [36] about Cialdini principles’ work in social
engineering: Agreeableness of a user has increased the vulnerability towards liking, authority,
reciprocity, and social proof. Neuroticism indicates a user is less susceptible to most social engineering attacks. Conscientious user may not resist the principles of authority, reciprocity, and commitment and consistency, especially, when commitments are made public. Extraversion user may
have greater vulnerability for the scarcity principle since the latter is considered as an excitement.
Conscientiousness may decrease user’s susceptibility to cyber attacks. Yet, conscientiousness has
a higher tendency to follow through commitments which may make the person susceptible to continuation of social engineering tactics. Agreeableness of a user may have increased susceptibility

31

to phishing, and share passwords. Openness reduces social engineering vulnerability as more digitally literate users better detect social engineering attacks. Authors in [85] have found that women
are more vulnerable to prize phishing attacks than men, and they found a high correlation between
neurosis and responsiveness to phishing attacks. In addition to Cialdini’s work, researchers like
Gragg and Stajano discussed what triggers of influence and scams. Table 2.1 is based on the work
of [11] and [36], and it summarizes the principles of Cialdini, Gragg, and Stajano. Those authors

Table 2.1: Cialdini, Gragg, and Stajano principles [11, 36]
Cialdini
Principles
Influence
Authority

Six
of

Social proof
Linking
and
Similarity
Commitment
and Consistency
Scarcity
Reciprocation

Gragg
Seven
Psychological
Triggers
Authority
Diffusion
responsibility
Deceptive relationship
Integrity
and
Consistency
Overloading
Reciprocation
Strong Affect

Stajano Seven
Principles
of
Scams
Social compliance
Herd
Deception
Dishonesty
Time
Need and Greed
Distraction

found that phishing emails use social engineering and depend on liking, deception, and similarity
principles. Distraction is the second most commonly used principle. The combination of principles
increase success of phishing attacks [11]. The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion in [32]
suggests that there are central (involve high elaboration) and peripheral (involve low elaboration)
routes to persuasion. A person who is faced with a persuasive message will run through it using
either a low or high elaboration.
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Insight on Discussed Theories and Principles

Applying described theories to cyber domains should help to identify targets by understanding
opportunities of a crime. This can be a subject of asset management and risk assessment. What
are the crown jewels? And what are their vulnerabilities? Should a company decoy offenders or
harden the targets? Who may be interested in hacking them? A hacker type and technique are to
be identified. A much better than a current situation in which those questions are asked during an
incident response. Those theories can also explain an initiation of deviant behavior, maintenance
of a behavior, and a motive of a cybercrime. They consider social and environmental factors
that could be missed when preparing a prevention program. Little research is done in this field.
One example is research can explore those theories’ use to develop simple models like Persona
non Grata that identify adversaries who can be inside or outside security perimeters. Integrating
different theories can further classify a deviant behavior as a misbehavior or a beginning of an
imminent attack. It seems that creating a social advocacy group and cyber awareness can help
improve users’ intentions and attitudes. Strong social bonds are much better than weaker social
bonds. We also discussed decision making and understanding alternatives and norms. Weapons
of influence are used by intruders, and the defenders lack the research to use them to defend
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The paper of [64] has suggestions on using weapons of
influence to support IT professionals. The Commonly used attack vectors by social engineers are
phishing (by email), vishing (phone call), impersonation and smishing (text message).
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Human Factors

Relate Human Factors to Cybersecurity

For the Human Factors, researchers can learn from the health and aviation industries since they
have extensive work in this discipline. Human factors is the discipline that works to optimize the
relationship between the humans and technology. We pick the Map-Assess-Recognize-Conclude
(MARC) process shown in Figure 2.6 and found in [164] to address behavioral aspects and focus
on human error.

Figure 2.6: Interpretation of MARC process, based on [164]

Mapping the user and the environment requires asking a set of questions on their characteristics,
roles, knowledge, skills, experience, tasks, responsibility, personality traits, access points and locations, human machine interface, etc. Assessment can analyze known factors, collect facts on user
capabilities and limitations, and the working environment. While assessing, one can recognize the
emerging factors that were not initially included in the mapping and can cause a human error. The
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two types of emergent factors are environmental (physical and human) and human (psychological,
physical). For example, fatigue or distraction can contribute to unintentional mistake, and loss
of vigilance can cause intentional mistakes. Fatigue, distraction and loss of vigilance could be
emergent factors. Norman argues that humans will make errors in the best designed systems so
the systems should be designed to minimize the effect of the error [152]. We agree with this view,
as human errors are known to cause a variety of accidents in various industries and organizations.
In aviation, twelve human errors or dirty dozen that lower people’s ability of performance and
safety, which could lead to maintenance errors are: lack of communication, complacency, lack of
knowledge, distraction, lack of teamwork, fatigue, lack of resources, pressure, lack of assertiveness, stress, lack of awareness, and norms [55]. We can easily relate those factors to cybersecurity.
Lack of communication is a problem for any organization. The survey by [174] found that 51%
report lack of information from security solutions and are unsure if their solution can tell the cause
of an attack. Lack of communication can certainly affect awareness negatively. Human factor
integration can contribute to environmental situations involving work shifts, communication during emergencies, communication of concerns and risks to contractors, identification of tools, and
communication of changes to procedures and plans. The main aim is to not miss important information, or create misunderstandings, or increase cost due to dealing with unhelpful information.
Complacency can cause false confidence at both organizational level and at the user level. A user
can feel confident because current behavior did not cause a breach, yet it does not mean that intentional wrong doing would not cause a future breach. Lack of knowledge can cause unintentional
mistake such as not logging off accounts, or writing difficult to memorize password on a paper,
etc. Distraction was already mentioned as a mistake and as a tactic of an attack. Lack of team
work can cause a breach because hackers have an understanding on how IT teams work, and they
can take advantage of their dysfunction. Fatigue was already mentioned as a problem factor. The
environment in which the user is working can cause pressure and stress while it does not provide
actionable policies or training to strengthen weaknesses. We discussed in SCT that environment
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affects behavioral factors. Lack of assertiveness can be connected to communication and selfefficacy. Lack of assertiveness can lead to not communicating directly with teammates potential
concerns, or proposing possible solutions, or asking for a feedback. Lack of awareness can be
caused by not being vigilant. Norms were discussed in Normative Behavior theory, and the user
can conduct negative or unsafe behavior, or take a wrong action in ambiguous cases.

Insight Based on Chemical Industry

Behavioral cybersecurity can benefit from the pitfalls recognized by human factors in other industries. We mention here our insight as an interpretation of human errors in cybersecurity based on
common mistakes that happen in chemical industry sites, that are labeled as major hazard sites
[154]. A parallel comparison of major vulnerable cyber environment to a major hazard site is the
following:

• Cyber defenders and users are not superhuman, and may not be able to intervene heroically
in emergencies. The incident response team is formed by many members and its efficiency
depends on many factors such as the team’s budget, training, whether teams are internal or
external, available tools, etc. Actually, more research is needed on resilience and agility
function of those response teams.
• Not documenting assumptions or data sources when documenting probabilities of human
failure. As mentioned previously, designs and plans are usually geared towards rational
cyber-actors.
• Assuming that a defender will always be present, detect a problem and immediately take an
appropriate action.
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• Assuming that users and defenders are well-trained to respond to incidents. Note that training does not prevent violations.
• Assuming that defenders and users will always follow procedures.
• Assuming that defenders and users are highly motivated and thus not prone to unintentional
errors or malicious violations.
• Ignoring the human element, especially human performance as if the cyberspace is unmanned.
• Inappropriate use of defense tools and losing sight of techniques or tools where they are the
most effective.
• Not knowing how to manage human error.

Moreover, we interpret three concerns that match with our literature review based on [154]:

1. The focus is more on technology than human aspects.
2. Ignoring initial vulnerabilities in design and development of systems and focus on training.
3. Blame incidents on a user with or without investigating the system and management failures.

Modeling and Simulation

Network security and all the tools associated with it do not provide perfect security. In fact, perfect
security does not exist. Hence, there is a continuous need to develop new solutions and tools and
test them. This is where modeling and simulation are helpful to save time and keep the cost down
while creating test-beds or environments in which those new tools or strategies are tested. Several
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tools are already established for network simulation since the 1990s such as Network Simulation
Testbed (NEST), Realistic and Large (REAL), OMNeT++, SSFNet, NS2, NS3, J-Sim, OPNET
and QualNet [148]. Yet, not many of these tools are created to address the human element. The
main challenge is to validate reliability and dependability of simulation in a comparison to reallife scenarios or data sets. The anonymity problem makes the challenge more difficult. The author
in [45] discussed the complexity issue in modeling; a simple model may not be as accurate, and
the fully detailed models of every threat and defense mechanisms may have higher accuracy but
are costly. Exploring answers to many questions about hackers’ or insiders’ behaviors could help
research (or enterprises) to use modeling and simulation to detect anomalies and respond. For
instance, what are all possible user behaviors? (Start an application, send a ping, open a file, etc.),
what are acceptable or normal behaviors? (Open an authorized file, start an application, etc.), and
what are unacceptable behaviors? (Open or attempt to open an unauthorized file, ping, send a bulk
of pages to a printer, and browse irrelevant sites that probably can come from copying and pasting
disable emails URLs, etc.)
The theoretical models of human behavior have been developed and some examples are stated in
[78]:
(1) Baysian-networks are useful to reason from effects to causes or from causes to effects or by a
mixed of inferences. Baysian networks are directed graphs and their models belong to the family of
probabilistic graphical models. They can be used to simulate the impact of actions or motives, and
build in action to mitigate the overall risk. Researchers have used Bayesian network models in intrusion detection systems. Those models have the flexibility to be combined with other techniques,
yet authors in [227] warn that the combination should be done with preserving Bayesian networks
strength to identify and represent relevant uncertainties. Many of the behavioral theories can be
tested by simulation. In [56], Instance-Based Learning Theory predicts that both defender and
adversary behaviors are likely to influence the defender’s accurate and timely detection of threats.
The defender’s cyber awareness is affected by the defender’s cognitive abilities (experience and
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tolerance) and attacker’s strategy (timing of threats).
(2) A neural-network is a set of algorithms, that are designed to recognize patterns based on a
cognitive model or try to mimic the properties of the human brain. Neural-network models are
relatively fast, but require a training set to learn and apply learning in operating mode. There are
several types of neural network and they are surveyed in [20] and [165]. They have useful applications in security and are already used in intrusion detection systems for anomaly detection [165].
Their work can be expanded in similar ways that banks currently using them to detect fraudulent
transactions. Hence, they can be trained to detect abnormal behaviors. Yet, they still face the
challenge of being used as a black box. The recommendation is to use them in combination with
artificial intelligence or other models.
(3) While an agent based system could identify characteristics of the environment, it might be able
to link user-based actions with their destructive impact on systems. Agent-based modeling is used
by social scientists to analyze human behavior and social interactions. Those models are useful
to study complex systems and the interaction of the networks can be shown using visualization
methods.
(4) Multi-Agent System is a behavior model in which agents can act autonomously on behalf of
their users. Agents can work individually or cooperatively. The Multi-Agent System is used recently in studying smart grid communication protocols.
(5) A rule-based or knowledge based system endeavors to imitate human behavior using an enumeration of steps with causal if/then association. Hence, there is precoding of possible situations.
This causes a problem where rules are not determined before. Rule-based models are used in
detecting anomalies in intrusion detection systems. In [39], authors proposed a methodology to
transform behavior rules used for intrusion detection to a state machine.
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Conclusion

Behavioral aspects of cybersecurity are becoming a vital area to research. The unpredictable nature of human behavior and actions make Human an important element and enabler of the level of
cybersecurity. The goal from discussing reviewed theories is to underscore importance of social,
behavior, environment, biases, perceptions, deterrence, intent, attitude, norms, alternatives, sanctions, decision making, etc. in understanding cybercrimes. Although those theories have some
limitations, they can still collectively be used to strengthen a behavioral model. Both the user’s
and the offender’s behaviors and intentions should be understood and modeled. Improving this
area will definitely help improve readiness and prevent incidents. No system is 100% secure, but
maximizing security cannot happen without considering the human element. The motto of Trust,
but Verify mentioned by President Ronald Reagan applies to cybersecurity. There is a level of trust
that is going to be put on a cyber domain in order to be able to work with it, however an ongoing
verification is necessary. Employees have to be knowledgeable of the risks, and differentiate desired from undesired behaviors. Yet, some employees may not comply because of implementing
techniques of neutralization. Cyber awareness training should be personalized because employees
may have different credentials or levels of access and responsibilities. They also have their own
biases to security. One size fits all awareness programs are not effective. There is a level of trust
that needs to be put on employees, however, technology and cyber awareness must be taught, and
a verification of compliance is necessary. More training is not always the solution. A conceptual
framework that is interdisciplinary is proposed to bring together behavioral cybersecurity, human
factors and modeling and simulation. Enterprises should be involved in research to make sure that
models work the way they are intended. Using a model that is available for the sake of convenience
without personalizing it may not be proper. George E. P. Box quote,

“All models are wrong, but some are useful"
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should motivate researchers and organizations to ask more questions about the usefulness of a
model, which in return promotes revising policies and approaches to security. Therefore, coordinating behavioral aspects and technical aspects of cybersecurity should be typical to each organization. Our future work will contribute to the three main concerns stated at the end of Section Human
Factors. For instance, we will explore cyber incidents such as insider threat from the perspective
of human error using the proposed framework. A concept model is depicted in Figure 2.7.

Figure 2.7: Mitigating human error concept model using proposed framework

The model can also support mitigating failure due to social engineering, or weapons of influence.
Hence, future work will support a different kind of cyber ontologies. We will also study deception
games using game theory with different attacker-defender scenarios. The final statement is remain
vigilant and be prepared to expect the unexpectable.
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CHAPTER 3: A NEW RGB IMAGE ENCRYPTION USING
GENERALIZED HEAT EQUATION ASSOCIATED WITH
GENERALIZED VIGENÈRE-TYPE TABLE
The primary aim of this chapter is to provide an efficient encryption algorithm for RGB images.
A new, fast and secure RGB image encryption using Generalized Heat Equation (GHE) associated
with Generalized Vigenère-type Table over Symmetric Group Sn (GVTSG) is proposed. Encryption keys are obtained from Random Key Sequence (RKS). We have generated RKS and GVTSG
with the help of GHE. By using this GHE, we are able to test the randomness over the generated
key sequence by applying National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) statistical test
suite. A formula for the keyspace has also been obtained and it is shown that this keyspace resists
brute force attack. The proposed encryption algorithm provides high security and a larger key
space. The keys for encryption or decryption consume less storage to store it on both sender and
receiver ends. Robustness of the proposed algorithm has been analyzed and compared with other
competing existing algorithms.

Introduction

Nowadays, image encryption is a prime concern to protect an image from being misused by unauthorized users. Images are used to communicate important information from one end to the other
through various types of networks like WhatsApp, Facebook, and YouTube, etc. In addition, transmission of images is often used in diverse areas such as defence services, engineering services, scientific experiments, medical imaging for diagnosis of diseases, advertising, art exhibition, online
education, telecommunication, and home automation. Adversaries are eagerly waiting to intercept
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or steal confidential information from the images that are shared or stored. Thus, we require a new,
fast, and secure image encryption method, which offers good security and is immune to common
attacks.
Over the last few years, chaos and hyper-chaos based image encryption methods were frequently
used [127, 233, 237, 59, 221, 38, 77, 209, 40, 231, 117, 33, 220, 50, 111, 37, 27, 199, 228, 220]
on account of their high sensitivity to the parameters, and pseudo-randomness, complex dynamical
behaviors. They have at least two positive Lyapunov exponents [233, 117]. They provide a great
deal of support to the cryptosystems in view of their uncertainty and large size of the keyspace. In
[127], a new complex chaotic map was developed over a complex field and used for image encryption. Recently, 5D hyper-chaotic system has also been proposed to encrypt grayscale image. The
5D hyper-chaotic is employed to generate hyper-chaotic sequences in a more complex way [233].
In [237] a new image encryption algorithm based on a linear hyperbolic chaotic system of partial
differential equations has been presented. Further, encryption schemes using DNA encoding with
elliptic curve cryptography has been proposed in [111]. Image processing with vector quantization
is another different method to encode images by decomposing pixels into vectors [37]. In [50],
the image size of 512 × 512 × 3 × 8 has been reshaped into 128 × 128 × 128 and 3D image permutation algorithm has been applied to relocate the pixels in image. Pixel transposition between
RGB channels using knight’s moving rules and a digital chaotic map is introduced. In contrast,
chaos and hyper-chaos based image encryption methods can be broken easily [121, 122, 180, 179,
182, 15, 119, 116, 198, 10]. Further, the authors in [120], explained that the proposed scheme [33]
has security flaws. Likewise, in reference [118], security issues have been studied and confirmed
that the method proposed in [220] can be broken effortlessly. Furthermore, Eli Bhiam and Adi
Shamir, [24, 23] have discussed differential attacks to various ciphers. Since then it becomes an
important attack to analyze during cipher design and it is done through the statistical tests such
as The Number of Changing Pixel Rate (NPCR) and The Unified Averaged Changed Intensity
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(UACI). Wu et al. [226] have addressed the problem related to chaos-based image encryption for
differential attacks both numerically and symbolically. For instance, in [96], the image of size
256 × 256; NPCR value is 99.42% and UACI value is 27.78%. These numerical values confirm
that the statistical tests are successful, but hypothesis tests for NPCR and UACI were failed for all
confidence intervals.
To overcome these security flaws on chaos and hyper-chaos image encryption schemes, we have
come up with a solution to accelerate speed and security (resist various types of attacks) by means
of a new technique. In this chapter, we proposed a new encryption scheme using GHE associated
with GVTSG. The proposed encryption scheme offers good security and resists various types of
attacks. We have analyzed hypothesis tests for NPCR and UACI and found that they fulfill the
demand for a strong image encryption scheme.

Random Key Generation Procedure

The generation of random key sequence is based on a generalized heat equation. The paper provides another notion to use the GHE to generate a Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG)
and corresponding coefficients present in the heat equation as initial parameters to generate keys.
Both, the key generation and encryption are the innovative procedure in the way they differ from
conventional key generation and encryption algorithms. Once the keys are generated they are used
in Generalized Vigenère-type Cipher on Symmetric Group Sn (GVCSG). The key generation provides an idea to generate keys from GHE. In this section, we introduce the way to generate the
random key sequence and keys for encryption in detail.
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Generalized Heat Equation and Random Key Sequence

The details of the generalized heat equation can be found in [166]. Equation (3.1) generates a
solution space over x, t and each entry produces sequence of digits involves random entries. The
complete process of random key sequence generation is as follows. The generalized heat equation
and the corresponding Initial Condition (IC) and Boundary Conditions (BCs) are shown below
with Equation 3.1.

PDE :

0
∂ ϕ(x,t)
= (∆x )2 ϕ(x,t), 0 < x < L,
∂t

IC : ϕ(x, 0) = a0 + a1 x + a2 x2 + · · · + a p x p 0 < x < L,

(3.1)

BC : ϕ(0,t) = ϕ(L,t) = 0, 0 < t < T,

2
0
d
where (∆x )2 = − dx
+ ix cot θ . With the help of finite difference method, we can find the
solution of the above system given in Equation (3.1) as follows:



2∆t
∆x
2
ϕ(x,t − ∆t) = ϕ(x,t) 1 + 2 + xcot θ ∆t − 2ixcotθ
∆x
∆t




∆t
−∆t
−∆t
+ 2ixcotθ
.
+ϕ(x − ∆x,t)
+ ϕ(x + ∆x,t)
∆x2
∆x
∆x2

(3.2)

The values of ∆x and ∆t are secret values that will be sent to the receiver via a secure channel. For
simulation purpose, we have taken IC as below

ϕ(x, 0) = 4x − 8x2 + 4x3
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∀x ∈ [0, L].

By plugging-in different value of θ as π/4, π/3, π/2, and 5π/6 in Equation (3.2), the corresponding absolute values of ϕ(x,t) are plotted in Figure 3.1. Here L and T are lengths of the rod and
time period, respectively. We partition the length of the rod into a finite number of intervals each
is of length ∆x. Similarly, we partition the time T into a finite number of sub-intervals each is of
length ∆t. Finally, we compute discrete points ϕ(x,t) by using Equation (3.2). In order to make
the absolute value of ϕ(x,t) an integer, we multiply absolute value of ϕ(x,t) by 10k , where k is a
sufficiently large positive integer and remove the decimal part. Now, we convert the resulted integer part into binary form. This leads us to have a binary sequence of size L/∆x × T /∆t × b, where
b represents the number of bits generated by each entry of ϕ(x,t). Then we convert this binary
sequence into one-dimensional array say RK of the same size and select an index j at random in
binary sequence and take a block S of size z from j onwards, which is to be XOR-ed as per the
code provided to achieve RKS.
The RK has been obtained mathematically from the solution surface (i.e. φ (x,t)) of the GHE (as
shown in Figure 3.1) by


 φ1,1 φ1,2 φ1,3

 φ2,1 φ2,2 φ2,3

φ (x,t) =  .
..
..
 ..
.
.


φ T ,1 φ T ,2 φ T ,3
∆t

∆t

∆t



...

φ1, L 
∆x

. . . φ2, L 
∆x  ,
.. 
..
.
. 


... φ T , L
∆t ∆x

multiply each element of this matrix by 10k where k is defined as before and round it, then φ (x,t)
becomes a new matrix represented by Iφ (x,t) and defined as follows
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 Iφ1,1 Iφ1,2 Iφ1,3

 Iφ2,1 Iφ2,2 Iφ2,3

Iφ (x,t) =  .
..
..
 ..
.
.


Iφ T ,1 Iφ T ,2 Iφ T ,3
∆t

∆t

∆t



...

Iφ1, L 
∆x

. . . Iφ2, L 
∆x  ,
.. 
..
.
. 


. . . Iφ T , L
∆t ∆x

convert all entries of this matrix into binary form as represented by BINφ (x,t) as follows



 BINφ1,1 BINφ1,2 BINφ1,3

 BINφ2,1 BINφ2,2 BINφ2,3

BINφ (x,t) = 
..
..
..

.
.
.


BINφ T ,1 BINφ T ,2 BINφ T ,3
∆t

∆t

∆t


BINφ1, L 
∆x

. . . BINφ2, L 
∆x  ,

.
..

..
.


. . . BINφ T , L ,
...

∆t ∆x

convert BINφ (x,t) into one dimensional row-matrix, which is called RK.





RK = BINφ1,1 BINφ1,2 BINφ1,3 . . . BINφ1, L . . . BINφ T ,1 BINφ T ,2 BINφ T ,3 . . . BINφ T , L .
∆x

∆t

∆t

∆t

∆t ∆x

The RK has been elaborated numerically for the solution surface of the GHE. For instance, if one
can take some portion on the surface of the generalized heat solution in the form of matrix as below



0.724862 0.347629 0.223964


,
φ (x,t) = 
0.234621
0.489689
0.146320




0.383649 0.746321 0.923876
and multiply by 105 and round it, we have
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72486 34762 22396


,
Iφ (x,t) = 
23462
48968
14632




38364 74632 92387
and convert all entries into binary form as represented by BINφ (x,t),



101011101111100 
10001101100100110 1000011111001010


,
BINφ (x,t) = 
101101110100110
1011111101001000
11100100101000




1001010111011100 10010001110001000 10110100011100011
again convert BINφ (x,t) into one dimensional array to get RK as follows:





RK = 10001101100100110 1000011111001010 . . . 10010001110001000 10110100011100011 .

RKS contains the data of binary numbers with size depending upon the number of iterations and
the chosen parameters L, ∆x and ∆t . The randomness of RKS has been proved by —NIST statistical
test suite [185] and all testes are passed successfully with good proportion and P-values. .

Keys (Keyi , i = 1, 2, 3, . . . 7) for Encryption Generated from RKS

To obtain keys for encryption/decryption, we take a sequence of binary blocks from RKS, where
a block is of size t, and t varies from 2 to (L/∆x × T /∆t × b). The number of entires in the
binary sequences is N × M × 6 + (N × M × 3 × 8)/r, where N and M are, the number of rows and
columns of original image, respectively. This binary sequence is converted into decimal sequence.
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Algorithm 1 RKS generation
Require: iterations, z, L, ∆x , ∆t , b, RK, S
iterations ← 50
count ← 0
j←0
while iterations ← 0 do
i← j
while i ≤ ((L/∆x ) × (T /∆t ) × b) − 1 do
RKS(count : count + z − 1) ← RK(i : i + z − 1) ⊕ S
S ← RKS(count : count + z − 1)
count ← count + z
i ← i+z
end while
j ← mod ( j + hash( j), z)
iterations ← iterations − 1
end while
return RKS

Figure 3.1: Different surface plots for absolute value of ϕ(x,t) (generalized heat solution) with
different θ values
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The first N × M × 6 entries from decimal sequence are reshaped into six key matrices of size
N × M and we call them as Key1 , Key2 , Key3 , Key5 , Key6 , and Key7 . Then take the next (N ×
M × 3 × 8)/r entries from the decimal sequence starts from index s = N × M × 6 + 1 and reshape
it into one dimensional array. We record the previous positions after sorting. The sequence of
previous positions is arranged in a new array called the permutation key, say Key4 , which is of size
(N × M × 3 × 8)/r.

Encoding and Decoding Scheme

In the encoding process, we are converting the image into a binary bit sequence, then divide this
string into blocks where each block contains r number of bits (r can be any divisor of the total
number of bits in the sequence). The advantage of this step is that it provides an extra layer of
security (due to the fact that the simple shuffling process in the encoded domain will provide
good confusion and diffusion both) to the proposed algorithm and also r can be treated as a users’
friendly parameter. For instance, if r = 3, then encoding scheme can be viewed in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2: Demonstration of encoding scheme for r = 3

Similarly, the decoding process carried out in a reverse manner.
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Generalized Vigenère-type cipher on Sn Group

In this section, we propose a new method to replace pixel values and its position in more random
way by using GVTSG (which prevents an adversary from using a brute force attack to find a
key). During the process of encryption the generalized Vigenère-type table has been obtained by
using elements of the symmetric group Sn (as in [112]). There are n! elements in Sn , and each
subsequent column of the generalized Vigenère-type table is filled by an element of Sn selected
at random without replacement manner. The generalized Vigenère-type table is designed large
enough to make such a search computationally infeasible. The GVTSG is of size n × q, where
1 ≤ q ≤ n!. Thus the total number of options to fill the generalized Vigenère-type table without
repeating of elements is (n! ) × (n! −1) × (n! −2) × . . . × (n! −q + 1).
For instance, if we take n = 3, and q = 3 then we get symmetric group S3 as shown in Figure 3.3
(i.e. symmetric group of equilateral triangle), and the Table 3.1 is created using the elements of S3 .

Table 3.1: Generalized Vigenère-type table of size 3 × 3 on S3 group
row/column
1
2
3

1
1
3
2

2
2
3
1

3
2
1
3

Similarly, if we take n = 26, q = 26 and use the first 26 elements from S26 , (say s126 , s226 , s326 . . . s26
26 )
then the columns of the table from 1 to q can be filled with s126 , s226 , s326 and s26
26 , respectively. This
will give a generalized Vigenère-type table which is the well known Table in the literature as shown
in the Table 3.2, where symbols are used as alphabets.
Thus, in general, the generalized Vigenère-type table of size n × q on Sn group is depicted in Table
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Figure 3.3: Symmetric group of equilateral triangle

3.3, which is used as a final step in the encryption process.

Generalized Vigenère-type Encryption on Sn Group

Let M be the message and K be the key, then encrypted message C can be obtained by the following
mechanism.
C = En (M, K) − 1,

M < n,

(3.3)

where En is the function takes entry from Mth + 1 row and K th column of generalized Vigenèretype table on Sn group.
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Table 3.2: Generalized Vigenère-type table of size 26 × 26 on S26 group
row/column
1
2
3
4
5
.
.
26

1
1
2
3
4
.
.
.
26

2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
3 4 5 6
4 5 6 7
5 6 7 8
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
1 2 3 4

... 24 25 26
... 24 25 26
... 25 26 1
... 26 1 2
... 1 2 3
... .
.
.
... .
.
.
... .
.
.
... 23 24 25

Table 3.3: Generalized Vigenère-type table of size n × q on Sn group (n = 256 for images)
row/column
1
2
3
4
5
.
.
n

1
111
7
3
200
.
.
.
25

2
211
3
34
5
.
.
.
37

3
4
3 100
114 23
15 134
6
67
.
.
.
.
.
.
212 199

5
5
43
211
n
.
.
.
8

...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...

q-2 q-1
q
10 151 22
111 n 143
34 101 17
1
2 163
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
50 190 71

For example, let us take the generalized Vigenère-type table on S5 group of size 5 × q where q = 5
as shown in Table 3.4.
Let us say the message be M = 2 and corresponding key be K = 5. Then the encrypted message
value will be tracking the value of (M + 1)th = 3rd row and K th = 5th column which is 1. So the
encrypted message be 0.

0 = E5 (2, 5) − 1
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(3.4)

Table 3.4: Generalized Vigenère-type table size 5 × 5 on S5 group
plain-text/key
1
2
3
4
5

1
2
4
1
5
3

2
1
2
5
3
4

3
5
3
2
1
4

4
3
4
2
5
1

5
4
2
1
3
5

Generalized Vigenère-type Decryption on Sn Group

We sort GVTSG column wise and store the previous positions of elements before they sorted. This
Table will be used for decryption.
Here C can be decrypted with key K by the following mechanism.

M = Dn (C, K) − 1,

C<n

(3.5)

where Dn is the function that takes entry from Cth + 1 row and K th column.

For the above example, we sort Table 3.4 in column wise and store the previous positions (as shown
in Table 3.5). Then the decrypted message value will track the value of (C + 1)th = 1st row and
K th = 5th column which is 3. So the decrypted message is 2.

2 = Dn (0, 5) − 1

(3.6)

Note that the robustness of algorithm depends on the following: In key1 any entry may have a
value greater than 255, if we could take t > 5 and this value will be handled by modulo 255.

54

Table 3.5: Generalized Vigenère-type table for decryption size 5 × 5 on S5 group
cipher-text/key
1
2
3
4
5

1
3
1
5
2
4

2
1
2
4
5
3

3
4
3
2
5
1

4
5
3
1
2
4

5
3
2
4
1
5

When we look on a conventional Vigenère cipher. The same table is used for encryption and
decryption process. But, encryption and decryption processes are different. The restriction here
is that the table can’t be changed (decryption will be difficult and take more time). While, in
the proposed algorithm, we use same procedure for encryption/decryption and different tables
(as explained in Table 3.4 & Table 3.5). The main advantage is that all possible permutation in
each column can be used in Generalized Vigenère-type table. This is completely an innovative
process (during decryption) by handling all permutation without any repetition in each column
in the Generalized Vigenère-type table. The proposed algorithm resists against chosen cipherimage/plain-image attacks completely as the columns of Vigenère-type table can be filled by any
permutation without repetition.

Proposed Encryption/Decryption Algorithm

In the following, we discuss the proposed encryption and decryption algorithm.

Encryption Algorithm

This section will elaborate on the proposed encryption procedure in detail and the flowchart is
given in Fig. 3. Here, we have divided the encryption process into three simple steps as below:
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Step 1: Modulo Bit-XOR: At first, we take each component (R, G, and B) of the original RGB
image, and then apply bitwise operation by using RKS obtained from GHE to get XOR-ed
components (say, R1 , G1 , and B1 )

R1 = (R ⊕ Key1 )(mod 256),
G1 = (G ⊕ Key2 )(mod 256),
B1 = (B ⊕ Key3 )(mod 256).

This process will be effective only if the keys (Key1 , Key2 and Key3 ) are random. And it
shows the effectiveness of proposed algorithm in terms of mapping each pixel value to a new
random pixel value with help of RKS.
Step 2: Array permutation shuffling in encoded domain: After executing Step 1, we combine
each components, R1 , G1 , and B1 to get a color image I1 . Then we apply encoding scheme
on image I1 as explained in array permutation shuffling, which is defined as below:
As explained in Section Encoding and Decoding Scheme, we apply the array permutation
shuffling on A by using Key4 to obtain a new shuffled array C. Here

C(i) = A(Key4 (i)),

we decode this shuffled array C into an image I2 by applying the reverse process of the
encoding scheme. This step is used to shuffle blocks randomly in the encoded domain that
offers confusion and diffusion both. Thus this process will provide another layer of security
to the encryption algorithm.
Step 3: Generalized Vigenère-type cipher on Sn group operation: Here, we decompose image I2
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into three components: R2 , G2 , and B2 and apply E256 on each components as follows:

R3 (i, j) = E256 (R2 (i, j), Key5 (i, j)(mod q)) − 1,
G3 (i, j) = E256 (G2 (i, j), Key6 (i, j)(mod q)) − 1,
B3 (i, j) = E256 (B2 (i, j), Key7 (i, j)(mod q)) − 1,

En is defined in Subsection Generalized Vigenère-type Encryption on Sn Group. Next, we
compose the components R3 , G3 , and B3 to get an encrypted image I3 . The columns of
GVTSG are filled with q-permutations which offer very good challenge to the adversary
for decrypting correct pixel values. Since the E256 columns are replaced with all possible
permutations, the decryption process takes more time. However, we have introduced new
method for decryption process that is efficient.

Decryption Algorithm
Step 1: Generalized Vigenère-type decipher on Sn group operation: Now, we decompose image
I3 into three components as R3 , G3 , and B3 and apply D256 on each components as follows:

R2 (i, j) = D256 (R3 (i, j), Key5 (i, j)(mod q)) − 1,
G2 (i, j) = D256 (G3 (i, j), Key6 (i, j)(mod q)) − 1,
B2 (i, j) = D256 (B3 (i, j), Key7 (i, j)(mod q)) − 1,

Dn is defined in Subsection (Generalized Vigenère-type Decryption on Sn Group). Then we
compose the components R2 , G2 , and B2 to get an image I2 .
Step 2: Array permutation reshuffling in encoded domain: After executing Step 1, We apply
encoding scheme on image I2 as explained in array permutation shuffling, which is defined
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Figure 3.4: Flowchart of the encryption algorithm

as below:
Now we apply the array permutation reshuffling on C by using Key4 to obtain reshuffled
array A. Here

A(Key4 (i)) = C(i),

decodes this reshuffled array A into an image I1 by applying reverse process of encoding
scheme.
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Step 3: Modulo Bit-XOR: Decompose I1 to get components R1 , G1 , and B1 , and then apply bitwise
operation by using RKS obtained from GHE to get original components (R, G, and B)

R = (R1 ⊕ Key1 )(mod 256),
G = (G1 ⊕ Key2 )(mod 256),
B = (B1 ⊕ Key3 )(mod 256).

Finally, compose the components R, G, and B to get an decrypted image I.
The original, encrypted and decrypted images are shown in Figure 3.5 for Baboon, Lena, Peppers, and Fruits with pats (a) original Baboon image, (b) encrypted Baboon image, (c) decrypted
Baboon image, (d) original Lena image (e) encrypted Lena image, (f) decrypted Lena image (g)
original Peppers image, (h) encrypted Peppers image, (i) decrypted Peppers image, (j) original
Fruits image, (k) encrypted Fruits image, (l) decrypted Fruits image.

Construction, Performance and Security Analysis

A new key space has been constructed in such a way that it can resists brute force attack infeasible.
Further, a secure encryption scheme should resist various types of cryptanalysis such as statistical
attacks, brute force attack, cipher-image, and plain-image attacks. We have performed several tests
to check the security of the proposed algorithm. Furthermore, we have also shown the efficiency
of the proposed algorithm by means of the time complexity.

Construction of the Key Space
• Key space involves the following parameters and construction has been derived as follows:
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Figure 3.5: Encryption/decryption results

– The symbol ∆x, and ∆t represent the size of intervals in length and time domain, respectively in GHE, such that ∆t ≤ ∆x and used as secret keys. These secret keys are
sensitive up to five decimal places. This sensitivity plays a very important role in the
encryption process.
– The parameter θ in the GHE is also used as a secret key and sensitive up to 5 decimal
places.
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– The positive integer k can be taken large enough to maintain high security.
– The index j varies from 1 to (L/∆x × T /∆t × b) − p are taken at random to generate
RKS. A slight change in the index j will result in a drastic change in the RKS.
– The block size z of S in RKS varies from 2 to (L/∆x × T /∆t × b) and is very sensitive
with respect to its size.
– The block size r (can be any divisor of the total number of bits in RGB image) in
encoding scheme plays an important role during encryption. It can be a user’ friendly
parameter to maintain computational costs.
– The polynomial coefficients of the initial condition are a1 , a2 , a3 , . . . , a p where each
coefficient is sensitive to up to 15 decimal places. This will also provide extreme
support to the proposed algorithm in terms of various types of attacks.
• Generalized Vigenère-type table of size n × q on Sn group: There are 256! permutations to
fill each column in generalized Vigenère-type table. Generalized Vigenère-type table of size
n × q on Sn group columns can be filled (256! ) × (256! −1) × (256! −2)... × (256! −q + 1)
many ways. Three generalized Vigenère-type tables are created for R, G and B components.
So the key space will be ((256! ) × (256! −1) × (256! −2)... × (256! −q + 1)) for generating
generalized Vigenère-type table.

So the constructed RKS is of size (256! ) × (256! −1) × (256! −2)... × (256! −q + 1) × 1015p+15 ×
η, where p is number of coefficients in polynomial, q is number of columns in generalized
Vigenère-type table and η = k × (L/∆x × T /∆t × b) − p × ((L/∆x × T /∆t × b) − 1) × r. For instance, if p = 10 and q = 100, then the key space is of size > 10151365 which is large enough to
resist brute force attack.
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Computational Complexity Analysis

To evaluate the computational complexity of the proposed algorithm, the total time complexity
is O(n × m × 3) for an RGB image size n × m × 3. Since each step in encryption algorithm has
the same time complexity for Bit-XOR operation, array permutation shuffling, and GVCSG. The
proposed algorithm is designed in such a way that the encryption and decryption processes are
taking an average of 0.519 and 0.518 seconds for an image of size 512×512×3 on Intel R CoreT M
i7-6700K CPU@ 4.00 GHZ Processor, 32GB RAM, Windows 10 Pro and MATLAB R2016a.
Thus, we can conclude that the running time of the proposed algorithm is very low.

Histogram Analysis

Histogram analysis shows the number of pixels with each intensity values from 0 to 255. A Histogram is very useful for an adversary to analyze graphical view of the data distribution (cipher
space). Histograms for distribution intensity of pixels over cipher images of Baboon, Lena, Fruits,
and Peppers (Figure 3.6 to Figure 3.9) with parts being (a) original red component, (b) encrypted
red component, (c) decrypted red component, (d) original green component, (e) encrypted green
component, (f) decrypted green component, (g) original blue component, (h) encrypted blue component, (i) decrypted blue component, clearly depicts, each distribution cannot be distinguishable
statistically.
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Figure 3.6: Histogram analysis for Baboon image

The Mean Square Error and Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio

The Mean Square Error (MSE) between the original and encrypted/decrypted image is calculated
by the following formula

MSE =

N M
1
∑ ∑ [ f (i, j) − fo(i, j)]2
N × M i=1
j=1

where f and fo are the intensity functions of encrypted/decrypted and original images and (i, j)
are the position of pixels. The proposed algorithm offers zero MSE value between original and
decrypted image and it is briefly described in Table 3.6. Similarly, MSE between the original and
encrypted images is large enough and it can be seen in Table 3.7. Thus, given the values presented
in Table 3.6, we can claim that the proposed algorithm has no loss in original data.
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Figure 3.7: Histogram analysis for Lena image

Table 3.6: Mean square error and signal to noise power ratio between original and decrypted
images of Baboon, Lena, Fruits, and Peppers respectively.
Image
components
R
G
B

Baboon
MSE PSNR
0
∞
0
∞
0
∞

Lena
MSE PSNR
0
∞
0
∞
0
∞

Fruits
MSE PSNR
0
∞
0
∞
0
∞

Peppers
MSE PSNR
0
∞
0
∞
0
∞

The term Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) is the ratio between the maximum value (power) of
a signal and the power of distorting noise that affects the signal. PSNR between the original and
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Figure 3.8: Histogram analysis for Peppers image

encrypted/decrypted image is calculated by the following formula
MAX 2
PSNR = 20 × log √ I ,
MSE

where MAXI is the maximum possible pixel value of the image. PSNR value between the original
and encrypted images should be sufficiently small to ensure that the originality between original
and encrypted image. The MSE and PSNR between original and decrypted image for Baboon,
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Figure 3.9: Histogram analysis for Fruits image

Lena, Fruits, and Peppers images are 0 and ∞ respectively. The values of MSE and PSNR between
the original and encrypted images are represented in Table 3.7.
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Table 3.7: Mean square error and signal to noise power ratio between original and encrypted
images of Baboon, Lena, Fruits, and Peppers respectively.
Image
components
R
G
B

Baboon
MSE
PSNR
8.6441e+03 8.7636
7.7390e+03 9.2438
9.4932e+03 8.3567

Lena
MSE
1.0519e+04
9.1034e+03
7.1417e+03

PSNR
7.9109
8.5388
8.5928

Fruits
MSE
1.1021e+04
9.8810e+03
9.1171e+03

PSNR
7.7088
8.1828
8.5322

Peppers
MSE
PSNR
7.9663e+03 9.1182
1.1274e+04 7.6099
1.1221e+04 7.6303

Correlation Analysis

Correlation between two adjacent pixels can be tested in three ways: by taking two vertically
adjacent pixels, by taking two horizontally adjacent pixels or by taking two diagonally adjacent
pixels of the encrypted image as shown in Tables 3.8–3.10. We have selected randomly 10000 pairs
of adjacent pixels to calculate their correlation horizontal and vertical coefficients. And selected
randomly 1000 pairs of adjacent pixels to calculate their correlation diagonal coefficient. Here,
rxy of each adjacent pair is calculated for the original and encrypted images using the following
formulas:
cov(x, y)
rxy = √ p ,
Dx Dy
cov(x, y) = E [(x − E(x))(y − E(y))] ,
1 N
E(x) = ∑ xi ,
N i=1
Dx =

1 N
∑ (xi − E(x))2,
N i=1

where x and y are values of two adjacent pixels in each channel, and N denotes the total number of samples taken. This phase essentially shows that after encryption, the correlation among
the image pixels is broken whereas decryption will bind the pixels with the original correlation.
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The correlation plots are presented in Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11 with parts being (a) horizontal correlation of original red component, (b) horizontal correlation of original green component,
(c) horizontal correlation of original blue component, (d) horizontal correlation of encrypted red
component, (e) horizontal correlation of encrypted green component, (f) horizontal correlation of
encrypted blue component, (g) vertical correlation of original red component, (h) vertical correlation of original green component, (i) vertical correlation of original blue component, (j) vertical
correlation of encrypted red component, (k) vertical correlation of encrypted green component, (l)
vertical correlation of encrypted blue component, (m) diagonal correlation of original red component, (n) diagonal correlation of original green component, (o) diagonal correlation of original
blue component, (p) diagonal correlation of encrypted red component, (q) diagonal correlation of
encrypted green component, (r) diagonal correlation of encrypted blue component.

Table 3.8: Horizontal correlation of Baboon, Lena, Fruits and Peppers images.
Image
components
R
G
B

Baboon
Plain image Cipher image
0.9302
1.8180e-05
0.8490
1.1265e-04
0.8947
6.4108e-05

Lena
Plain image Cipher image
0.9274
1.7240e-04
0.9647
7.6722e-06
0.9588
7.2944e-05

Fruits
Plain image Cipher image
0.9699
9.8909e-05
0.9355
4.4187e-05
0.9394
3.0847e-06

Peppers
Plain image Cipher image
0.9304
3.5584e-07
0.9568
2.2773e-04
0.9318
7.0229e-06

Table 3.9: Vertical correlation of Baboon, Lena, Fruits and Peppers images
Image
components
R
G
B

Baboon
Plain image Cipher image
0.8458
2.8730e-05
0.8444
4.0985e-05
0.8904
1.2435e-06

Lena
Plain image Cipher image
0.9781
6.0870e-05
0.9769
2.3864e-04
0.9184
1.2170e-04

Fruits
Plain image Cipher image
0.9492
1.1905e-04
0.9581
2.2418e-04
0.9012
1.0184e-04

Peppers
Plain image Cipher image
0.9285
3.4558e-04
0.9683
2.2684e-05
0.9757
2.9580e-04

Table 3.10: Diagonal correlation of Baboon, Lena, Fruits and Peppers images
Image
components
R
G
B

Baboon
Plain image Cipher image
0.7406
2.7378e-05
0.7528
1.3283e-04
0.7519
6.0793e-05

Lena
Plain image Cipher image
0.8889
1.0221e-05
0.8557
1.6250e-04
0.7682
2.3181e-04

68

Fruits
Plain image Cipher image
0.9116
4.4659e-04
0.9216
2.9022e-04
0.9297
9.7860e-04

Peppers
Plain image Cipher image
0.9006
8.3210e-07
0.9129
8.8114e-05
0.8761
3.6587e-04

Figure 3.10: Correlation analysis for Baboon image

Key Change Analysis

Assume that the intruder is trying to recover the image by having all the original keys except one.
However, we can claim that an intruder cannot recover the original image by knowing all the exact
keys except one and output can be seen in Figure 3.12 with parts being (a) incorrectly decrypted image with marginal difference of 0.000000000000001 in the coefficient of initial condition of GHE,
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Figure 3.11: Correlation analysis for Lena image

(b) incorrectly decrypted image with slight variation in order of generalized Vigenère-type table
order from (1,2,3) to (3,1,2) corresponding to R, G and B components respectively, (c) incorrectly
decrypted image with shift of index s by s + 1 in array permutation key, (d) incorrectly decrypted
image with small variation in bit-XOR key order (Key1 , Key2 , Key3 ) to (Key3 , Key1 , Key2 ) corresponding to R, G and B components respectively, (e) incorrectly decrypted image with exchange
of generalized Vigenère-type key order (Key5 , Key6 , Key7 ) to (Key7 , Key5 , Key6 ) corresponding to
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R, G and B components respectively, (f) incorrectly decrypted image with marginal increment of
0.00001 in secret key ∆x, (g) incorrectly decrypted image with marginal increment of 0.00001 in
secret key ∆t, (h) incorrectly decrypted image with marginal increment of 0.00001 in secret key
θ , (i) incorrectly decrypted image with marginal increment of 1 in secret key k, (j) incorrectly decrypted image with marginal increment of 1 secret key in j, (k) incorrectly decrypted image with
marginal increment of 1 in secret key z, (l) incorrectly decrypted image with marginal increment
of 1 in secret key r, (m) correctly decrypted image with correct keys.

Differential Attacks

Variations in the original image, are made by the attackers who also make use of the algorithm
which is proposed to encrypt the original image before and after changing pixels, and through
estimating similarity of two encrypted images, they discover the relationship between the original
and the encrypted images. However, if any minor change in the original image causes a large
change in the encrypted image then the differential attack becomes useless. In this chapter, we
have put forward a new method to deal with differential attacks.

NPCR Analysis

The Number of Pixels Change Rate (NPCR) refers to the change rate of the number of pixels of
the encrypted image while one pixel of plain-image is changed. And it is calculated as follows:
M
∑N
i=1 ∑ j=1 D(i, j)
× 100%,
NPCR : N(C ,C ) =
N ×M
1

2
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Figure 3.12: Key space analysis

where

D(i, j) =




1, if C1 (i, j) = C2 (i, j)


0, otherwise
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where C1 and C2 are encrypted images before and after one-pixel change in plain-image, and a
bipolar array D(i, j) defined as above.

UACI Analysis

The Unified Average Change Intensity (UACI) measures the average intensity of differences between two encrypted images. It is mathematically defined as:
1
2
N
M |C (i, j)−C (i, j)|
∑
∑
j=1
i=1
255
× 100%,
UACI : U(C1 ,C2 ) =
N ×M

where C1 and C2 are encrypted images before and after one-pixel change in plain-image. Table 3.11
shows the values of NPCR (> 99%) and UACI (33%) for each color component between two
encrypted images. Experimental results show the estimated expectations and variance of NPCR
and UACI are very close to the theoretical values, which justify the validity of theoretical values
[226]. Hence, the proposed scheme is immune against differential attacks.

Table 3.11: NPCR and UACI values of the proposed algorithm.
Testing encrypted-image
R
Baboon
99.6307
Lena
99.6212
Peppers
99.6155
Fruits
99.6078
Average of each component 99.6188
Average for all images
99.6189

NPCR(%)
G
99.5983
99.6380
99.6063
99.6178
99.6376
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B
99.6082
99.5930
99.5949
99.6052
99.6003

R
33.4380
33.4539
33.3955
33.4213
33.4285
33.4444

UACI(%)
G
33.4827
33.4275
33.4140
33.4953
33.4549

B
33.4839
33.4399
33.4249
33.4500
33.4497

Statistical Test for NPCR

From [226], we can demonstrate that the proposed algorithm is good by using statistical test for
NPCR. Suppose we have two encrypted-images C1 and C2 of size 512 × 512 × 3 each, then hypotheses (H0 and H1 ) with significance level α for N(C1 ,C2 ) are:

H0 : N(C1 ,C2 ) = µN

H1 : N(C1 ,C2 ) < µN .

Reject H0 , if N(C1 ,C2 ) < Nα∗ , otherwise accept H0 , where

Nα∗ = µN − φ −1 (α)σN =

µN =

q 

F
F − φ −1 (α) MN

F
,
F +1
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F +1

,

σN2 =

F
,
(F + 1)2 MN

where F largest pixel value in the original image.

Table 3.12: Statistical test for NPCR
Testing encrypted-image
Numerical values
Baboon (99.6103)
Lena (99.6124)
Fruits (99.6356)
Peppers (99.6174)

µN
99.6094

F = 255
∗
σN
N0.05
0.0122 99.5893
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS

∗
N0.01
99.5810
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS

∗
N0.001
99.5717
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS

We can observe from Table 3.12, N(C1 ,C2 ) values for Baboon, Lena, and Peppers exceeds Nα∗
values for α = 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001. So, we can accept the null hypothesis (H0 ). Hence, the
NPCR values confirm that the proposed algorithm is good.

Statistical Test for UACI

Likewise, again from [226], we can demonstrate the proposed algorithm is good by using statistical
test for UACI. Assuming that, we have two encrypted-images C1 and C2 of size 512×512×3 each,
then hypotheses (H0 and H1 ) with significance level α for U(C1 ,C2 ) are:

H0 : U(C1 ,C2 ) = µU ,
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H1 : N(C1 ,C2 ) < µU ,

Reject H0 , if U(C1 ,C2 ) ∈
/ (Uα∗+ ,Uα∗− ), otherwise accept H0 , where

Uα∗+ = µU + φ −1 (α/2)σU ,

Uα∗− = µU − φ −1 (α/2)σU ,

µU =

σU2 =

F +2
,
3F + 3

(F + 2)(F 2 + 2F + 3)
,
18(F + 1)2 MNF

From the Table 3.13, U(C1 ,C2 ) values for Baboon, Lena, and Peppers belongs to the interval
(Uα∗+ ,Uα∗− ) for α = 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001. So, we can accept the null hypothesis (H0 ). Hence, the
UACI values confirm that the proposed algorithm is good.

76

Table 3.13: Statistical test for UACI
Testing encrypted-image
µU
Numerical values
Baboon (33.4555)
Lena (33.4682)
Fruits (33.4115)
Peppers (33.4422)

33.4635

F = 255
∗−
∗−
∗−
∗+
∗+
∗+
σU
U0.05
/U0.05
U0.01
/U0.01
U0.001
/U0.001
33.3730
33.3445
33.3115
0.0462
33.5541
33.5826
33.6156
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS

Cropped Attack Analysis

The encrypted text has been cropped and analyzed over data loss in real-time communication by
the proposed algorithm. We performed two different kinds of attack over an encrypted image and
resulting images have been analyzed over the loss of data. The intention is to check whether there
is visibility that exists or not in the decrypted image. Figure 3.13 summarizes with (a) encrypted
image from different locations in each layer (R, G and B) is cropped , (b) decrypted result, (c)
encrypted image from same locations in each layer (R, G and B) is cropped, (d) decrypted result.

Communication Channel Noise Analysis

The communication channel is influenced by various noises. For example, in the wireless medium,
the losses in signals are multi-path propagation environment, attenuation, interference, and nearfar problem. These factors make a loss in transferred message bits in the communication channel.
Images transmitted through medium should not lose much data once after received at the other end.
An algorithm should provide confidence about images received in other ends; not having more data
loss. We checked with Salt & Pepper noise test with images and results are depicted in Figure 3.14
with (a) encrypted image with Salt and Pepper noise attacked and (d) decrypted result.
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Figure 3.13: Cropped attack experiment

Figure 3.14: Communication channel noise analysis

Information Entropy

Information entropy is used to analyze the randomness of information contained in the image. The
information entropy is defined by the symbol H(m) as below.
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2N −1

H(m) =

∑


p(mi ) log2

i=0

1
p(mi )



where P(mi ) denotes the probability of symbol mi . For a purely random source emitting 2N symbols, the entropy is H(m) = N. In gray-scale image pixels are in the range [0, 255], the maximum
information entropy is 8. Thus for a secure encryption algorithm, the entropy value should be
closed to the value 8. The proposed algorithm provides entropy value greater than 7.9912 for all
encrypted images as depicted in Table 3.14, which is very closed to 8. We have compared the
information entropy of encrypted Lena image with other existing algorithms in Table 3.21. Thus
data presented Tables 3.14 and 3.21 confirm that the proposed algorithm is robust against entropy
attack.

Table 3.14: The result of information entropy
RGB Components
Baboon
Lena
Fruits
Peppers

R
G
B
7.9912 7.9915 7.9914
7.9912 7.9914 7.9915
7.9915 7.9915 7.9917
7.9914 7.9918 7.9918

Comparison of Proposed Algorithm with Others

The proposed algorithm has been compared with existing competing methods [236, 50, 27, 111,
225, 124, 125, 103]. Keyspace of the proposed algorithm has been compared with the key space
of other competing methods and results are shown in Table 3.15. The proposed key space is good
enough to resist a brute force attack. Values of NPCR, and UACI analyses have been compared and
79

shown in Table 3.16 and Table 3.17, respectively. The proposed algorithm has better NPCR and
UACI values than existing algorithms. Further, a fine comparison on correlation has been done in
three different directions as horizontal correlation shown in Table 3.18, vertical correlation shown
in Table 3.19, and diagonal correlation shown in Table 3.20. Values presented in these Tables
3.17–3.19 demonstrate that each pixel value after encryption has very low correlation. Finally,
information of entropy on the encrypted image with other different encryption algorithms has been
compared and we found that the proposed algorithm has better entropy than others that can be seen
in Table 3.21.

Table 3.15: Compare the key space of the proposed algorithm with existing algorithms
Algorithm
Ref. [50]
Ref. [111]
Ref. [27]
Proposed algorithm

Key space
1072.7393 (fixed size)
1043.3483 (fixed size)
3.12 × 10144 (fixed size)
((256! ) × (256! −1) × (256! −2)... × (256! −q + 1)) × 1015p+15 × η (variable size)
> 10151365 for p = 10, q = 100)

Table 3.16: Comparison on NPCR analysis of the proposed method with authors [236, 50, 27]
RGB Components

Red
Green
Blue

NPCR (%)
Proposed method
99.6188
99.6376
99.6003

Ref. [236]
99.6086(Avg)
-
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Ref. [50]
Ref. [27]
99.6059 99.3500(Avg)
99.6013
99.5735
-

Table 3.17: Comparison on UACI analysis of the proposed method with authors [236, 50, 27]
RGB Components

Red
Green
Blue

UACI (%)
Proposed method
33.4285
33.4549
33.4497

Ref. [236]
33.4629(Avg)
-

Ref. [50]
Ref. [27]
32.9915 33.2500(Avg)
30.7161
30.2703
-

Table 3.18: Comparison of horizontal correlation of encrypted image of Lena image with other
authors [236, 50, 111]
RGB Components
Red
Green
Blue

Proposed algorithm
Ref. [236]
2.3337e-06
-0.004223(Avg)
7.5744e-04
6.5158e-04
-

Ref. [50]
0.0063
0.0110
0.0104

Ref. [111]
0.0035
-0.0097
0.0186

Table 3.19: Comparison of vertical correlation of encrypted image of Lena image with other authors [236, 50, 111]
RGB Components
Red
Green
Blue

Proposed algorithm
Ref. [236]
5.2284e-04
0.000551(Avg)
6.4830e-04
3.5126e-04
-

Ref. [50]
0.0004
-0.0064
0.0003

Ref. [111]
-0.0041
0.0053
0.0107

Table 3.20: Comparison of diagonal correlation of encrypted image of Lena image with other
authors [236, 50, 111]
RGB Components
Red
Green
Blue

Proposed algorithm
Ref. [236]
1.5742e-04
-0.003665(Avg)
8.7294e-07
1.9578e-04
-
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Ref. [50]
-0.0020
0.0166
0.0049

Ref. [111]
-0.0410
-0.0085
-0.0175

Table 3.21: The information entropy of the encrypted Lena image by using different encryption
algorithms
RGB Components
Proposed algorithm
Ref. [225]
Ref. [181]
Ref. [124] (bit-level permuted)
Ref. [124] (Using Chen system)
Ref. [125]
Ref. [103]

R
G
B
7.9912 7.9914 7.9915
7.9893 7.9896 7.9903
7.9732 7.9750 7.9715
7.9791 7.9802 7.9827
7.9871 7.9881 7.9878
7.9874 7.9872 7.9866
7.9278 7.9744 7.9705

Conclusion

A new, fast and secure RGB image encryption using generalized heat equation associated with
generalized Vigenère-type table over symmetric group Sn is proposed. With the help of the generalized heat equation and generalized Vigenère-type table, we have generated a random key sequence. The randomness of this sequence has been verified successfully by using NIST statistical
test suite Using the generated random sequence, we have constructed a new random key space
which will provide a lot of support to the proposed algorithm in terms of attacks. Comparison with
the existing competing methods have been done and the results are reported in Tables 3.15–3.21.
The data presented in Tables 3.14 and 3.21 confirm that the proposed algorithm renders entropy
value closed to 8. Further, keyspaces, key sensitivity, histogram analysis, correlation plots, correlation coefficients, MSE, PSNR, NPCR, UACI, and statistical tests for NPCR and UACI have
been performed and the results of these analyses suggest that the proposed algorithm can resist exhaustive attacks effectively. Thus the proposed algorithm offers better security and resistance for
various types of attacks without compromising the running time. In the future, we plan to explore
the usage of RKS in secure communication of UAV’s (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles).
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CHAPTER 4: VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS AND ATTACK GRAPHS IN
CYBERSECURITY

Introduction

Enterprise networks continue to struggle with maintenance of network performance, availability
and security [67]. For instance, the Identity Theft Resources Center [98] had recorded 1,339 U.S.
data breaches in 2017, exposing more than 174,402,528 confidential r ecords. In cumulative view,
between January 1, 2005 and December 27, 2017 number of breaches is 8,190 with 1,057,771,011
of exposed records. Based on The Federal Bureau Investigation’s (FBI) Internet Crime Complaint
Center [197] receives an average of 280,000 complaints each year, or an average of 800 complaints
a day, and in 2016 there was a total loss of $1.33 Billion. It’s also widely recognized that the time
it takes for an organization to realize that they have been successfully attacked is measured in
hundred of days, and not in hours. Organizations in Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA)
report [86] that it took three times longer to detect a compromise in the region, it was 469 days
versus a global average of 146 days. Many organizations in EMEA were re-compromised within
months of an initial breach. Consequently, it’s crucial for any institution to analyze the security of
its network from every access point. The attackers may have one or various motives, and they are
determined to breach the systems. Once they enter one access point they will try to penetrate every
level in the network. Hence, the motivation of the defender to protect the systems cannot stop at
the administrative duties. The defender must possess tools that can analyze enterprise network to
discover vulnerabilities before the attackers do. One of the most effective methods is to search
for all possible multi-access points, the various possible attack paths by building attack graphs
and simulate the attacks [128]. The scenario graph demonstrates every possible path to break
into a network security [128]. Consequently, network attack graph depicts all possible penetration
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scenarios. Attack graphs give an overview of potential scenarios that can lead to an unauthorised
intrusion [191]. The challenge in security of zero-day exploits will always be a challenge since
attackers develop exploits for those vulnerabilities that have not yet been disclosed. Hence, it is
necessary to explore unexpected attackers behavior and not be limited by predefined information
[3]. Since we see cyber situational awareness to be an important framework in which attack graphs
can be implemented, we’ll address it first. Some related and interesting work can be found in [21
through 32].

Cyber Situational Awareness

Cyber situational awareness (CSA) is important for an effective cyber security analysis and incident
response. However, it hasn’t been well studied [202]. Several open source tools and products were
developed to tackle cyber problems, with U.S. Government being a primary client. However, those
tools have not improved CSA of cyber security analysts. Braford et al. in chapter 1 of "Cyber
SA: Situational Awareness for Cyber Defense" discuss that aspects of situational awareness (SA)
consists of [30]:

• Situation perception that includes recognition and identification of the type of attack, the
target, etc.
• Impact assessment that includes assessment of current and of future damage.
• Situation tracking is important to be aware of its progress.
• Awareness of intent and threat hunting techniques.
• Back-tracking and forensics to analyze reasons and methods that caused a situation attack.
• Evaluation of the collected SA information.
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• Lessons learned about current situation and how it’ll evolve in the future.

Therefore, CSA can be summarized in three major steps [30]:

1. Recognition which provides basis for better SA.
2. Comprehension in which knowledge and data apply context to make sure the information
is meaningful to the specific circumstances.
3. Projection that is used to make educated and informed assessment about future attacks and
mitigate their threats .

The diagram in Figure 4.1 shows how the situation can evolve in a non-linear way.

Figure 4.1: A nonlinear SA process [170]

This is equivalent to sensemaking in [171] that includes learning new areas, solving not so well
defined problems, acquiring SA, and participating in knowledge sharing; as those steps should lead
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to deeper understanding. CSA requires time to develop, and one should work on building a model
that better prepares for future attacks. It’s clear that cyber defenders ought to deal with uncertainty
as it’s not possible for them to be aware of everything running within every computer inside the
network. There is also no efficient mechanism to digest the logs even if every device can be logged.
To summarize, one should find answers to these questions in CSA [170]:

• Is there an intrusion?
• Where is the intruder?
• How does the situation evolve?
• What is the impact of the attack on the network?
• How to assess a damage?
• What behavior is expected from the attackers?
• What strategies they may take?
• Can we predict future scenarios of the current situation ?
• How did the intruder manage to make it happen?
• What was the target or goal of the intruder?

Figure 4.2 depicts CSA framework in which vulnerability analysis is conducted by a topological
approach allowing to generate attack graphs by encoding probabilistic knowledge of the attacker’s
behavior. They merged multiple attack types to a compact data structure and define an index
structure on top of it to classify multiple alerts and data from sensors. A dependency analysis
is performed to generate dependency graphs. Consequently, attack graph scenario is made from
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joining dependency graphs and attack graphs. Scenario graphs show ways in which an intruder
can exploit known vulnerabilities and effect the system. The authors also proposed an algorithm
for both detection and prediction, and it scaled well with large graphs [170].

Figure 4.2: CSA framework [170]

Attack Graphs

Computer networks may have vulnerabilities that can be exploited in ways that serve the goals of
the intruder. Although a successful attack may require multiple steps in various order, The usual
network attack consist of these stages:

1. Reconnaissance in which attackers gather information about a target to use in the next step.
Some of the techniques used are social engineering, physical reconnaissance and dumpster
diving. Reconnaissance can be active or passive depending on whether the interaction happened with the system or not.
2. Scanning is the next step to discover about running services on a target computer or network.

87

It is a development of active reconnaissance since the attacker engages with system to learn
about its vulnerabilities.
3. Gaining Access is a logical next step after attempting to exploit identified vulnerabilities.
4. Maintaining Access is possible with the intruder planting own Trojan software, packet analyzer, or additional back-door network access codes.
5. Covering tracks or a hiding stage in which the intruder tries to cover-up the crime. This
stage may include cleaning logs, hidden background programs, and installing codes to conceal malicious software from legitimate users.

A case example with an attack graph is given by J. Li, X. Ou, and R. Rajagopalan in chapter 4 of
[30]. In this example, attack paths are found after configuration analysis. Figure 4.3 shows it.

Figure 4.3: A case example of an attack scenario and attack graph (WebSevrer p1 , NFS Protocol
p2 , WebServer p3 , File Server p4 ) [30]

The intruder breaches web server (a critical attack vector, i.e. used in Equifax breach in 2017) from
a remote location by exploitation of CVE-2002-0392 vulnerability and gains local access on the
server. Then attempts to alter data on file server in order to exploit vulnerabilities to get access on
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the machine. The intruder installs a Trojan-horse program, and wait for a user on work station to
run it, and gain control of the station. Details of this scenario graph can be found in [30]. Although
this attack graph, or any other attack graph of similar size, may look simple, it could still involve
complicated computations of the likelihood that an attack can be successful. Figure 4.4 shows a
simple example of an attack graph found in [232]. The oval nodes being the exploit nodes and the
conditional nodes being the text nodes.

Figure 4.4: Simple example of an attack graph [232]

The complexity of attack graphs topology create many shared dependencies. For instance, node
c10 can be reached by an intruder from exploiting e4 or e5 that fully depend upon c7 . Hence, the
paths to e4 and e5 are not independent. Furthermore, one cannot assume independence in attack
graphs, and should measure the probability of possible multistep attacks. Yun, Xi-shana, and Zhi89

chang in [232] presented a method for security risk assessment that combines the attack graphs
and the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) in order to address incorrect probability
computing caused by conjoint dependencies in nodes. Briefly, CVSS allows to identify the principal characteristics of a vulnerability and score its severity. CVSS is formed by three metric groups
stated in [194]:

1. Base including exploit ability metrics and impact metrics. This includes the ease to exploit
the vulnerability component, and the consequence or the impacted component. Vulnerability
characteristics that are constant across user and environment.
2. Temporal represents the characteristics of a changing vulnerability, yet not across user environments.
3. Environmental represent metrics characteristics of a vulnerability related to a particular
user’s environment.

The algorithm in [232] calculated either accurately or approximately the probability of nodes depending on their depth, a setting number, and a formed theorem. This algorithm solved the problem
of probabilistic incorrect computing. It was experimented in a 5 to 20 hosts in a simulation, and
showed some effectiveness over HOMER’s algorithm [94]. Wang, Du, and Yang presented an
automated method that generates and analyzes attack graphs in [219]. They formed it using symbolic model checking algorithms, and tested it on a small network example. They tested it on
a small operational network using applied Network Security Planning Architecture and found a
faulty firewall. Shahriari, Ganjisaffar, Jalili, and Habibi modeled networks’ topologies, their configurations and vulnerabilities in [87]. A framework that is similar to MulVal which we’ll address
later in the chapter. They implemented an expert system based on a framework for automatic
topological multihost vulnerability analysis. A methodology that explores all paths of attacks and
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combats unauthorized access by an attacker. The output of the expert system is accessed by the
network administrator from the User Interface which allows to control the inference engine. The
latter processes logical inferences based on the Knowledge Base input, which collects facts and
inference rules. Knowledge base component gets input from the Host Vulnerability Extractor that
takes information from vulnerability databases and host scanners. The expert system performed
vulnerability analysis of a network with 1600 hosts in reasonable time (31 seconds) [87].
Noel and Jajodia applied adjacency matrix clustering to network attack graphs in order to correlate
attacks and predict them [150]. Reachability across the network is found by self-multiplying the
clustered adjacency matrices to find number of steps to an attack. The reachability analysis summaries how changing a network configuration can affect the attack graph. The graphical technique
matches columns and rows of the clustered adjacency matrix to show multiple-step attacks. This
allows to identify impact depending on the number of steps to victim machines, and identify the
sources of the attack. The adjacency matrix brings simplicity to their approach since a single matrix
element represents each graph edge. Graph vertices are implicitly represented as matrix rows and
columns. The adjacency matrix avoids the typical crowded edge representation of small and large
graphs. Their clustering algorithm is advantageous because it scales linearly with network size, it’s
parameter-free, and completely automatic. Yang, Liang, Yang, and Zhu experiment in [230] show
that the built hierarchical architecture constructed is good for assessing the potential security risks
of four levels: Network, hosts, services and vulnerabilities. The vulnerability attack link generated
algorithm proposed in their paper could help system administrators mitigate the potential security
risks in the computer system. This algorithm is composed of two sub algorithms: (1) host access
link generated algorithm and (2) vulnerability attack link generated algorithm, details can be found
in [230]. Abraham and Nair propose in [3] a stochastic approach for security evaluation based on
attack graphs, taking into account CVSS scoring. They used MulVal (developed by Kansas State
University) to generate logical attack graphs in a polynomial time. A simulation of the Absorbing
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Markov chain is conducted on the the attack graph generated for the network. They used a realistic
network to analyze and capture security properties and optimize the application of patches. The
proposed model can assist to harden the system by identifying its critical parts and predicting the
total security variation over time [3].
Lippmann and Ingols, in 2005, surveyed attack graphs papers that focused on three goals [123]:

1. Papers construct attack graphs to analyze network security.
2. Papers about formal languages that are complex or simple to describe states in attack graphs.
Those languages would typically define preconditions for a successful intrusion, and postconditions or changes in network state after an intrusion.
3. Papers describe attack graphs used with intrusion detection systems (IDS) to group alerts.

They found that most of algorithms were tested on small networks with fewer than 20 hosts. Consequently, we find that, after 2005, several papers tackled scalability problem and attempted larger
networks but not the desirable to enterprise networks with over 10,000 hosts. Nevertheless, research using attack graphs has achieved a number of good prototypes that are summarized in Table
4.1.

Table 4.1: Attack graphs toolkits [3]
Toolkit Name
MulVAL
TVA
NETSPA
Cauldron
Firemon

Complexity
O(n2 ) O(n3 )
O(n2 )
O(nlogn)
O(n2)
O(nlogn)

Open Source
Yes
No
No
No
No
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Developer
Kansas State University
George Mason University
MIT
Commercial
Commercial

Cauldron is a commercialized TVA that was developed by George Mason University, hence, it applies the concept shown in Figure 4.5. In this chapter, we limit the survey to TVA discussed below.
FireMon is the commercialized NetSPA, adopted by FireMon, LLC. We also limit discussion to
NetSpa. Another commercial toolkit is Skybox View by Sktbox Security Inc.; it has a polynomial
complexity O(n3 ).

Topological Vulnerability Analysis

Jajodia and Noel discuss Topological Vulnerability Analysis (TVA) in [30]. TVA tries to discover
the paths through a network that an intruder may follow. Figure 4.5 shows the concept of TVA
architecture.

Figure 4.5: Topological Vulnerability Analysis [30]

Network capture builds a model of the network, Vulnerability database represents a comprehensive
repository of reported vulnerabilities and the record listing of the affected software or hardware,
and the Exploit Conditions conceals how each vulnerability may be exploited and the consequence
of the breach (preconditions and postconditions). All inputs from network capture are used to set
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up an Environment Model for multistep attack graph simulation. The Graph Engine generates all
possible attack path scenarios after analyzing vulnerability dependencies, coordinating the before
and after exploitation conditions. The TVA outputs Visual Analysis of attack graphs and calculate Optimal Counter Measures. TVA attack graphs can support intrusion detection system. TVA
matches the network model against a database of reported vulnerabilities from the examples included in Figure 4.5 [30]. Although TVA has some technical challenges like entering the exploits
information by hand it can be used to determine safe network configurations with respect to the
goal of maximizing available network services. It also has potential application to identify possible
attack responses and improve intrusion detection systems.

A Network Security Planning Architecture

A Network Security Planning Architecture (NETSPA) generates attack graphs from a network
topology and graphs of all potential paths that can be exploited for a user-defined network. These
graphs and their associated statistics, such as number of hosts compromised and attacker privilege
levels, allow a network administrator to determine likely intrusion paths and extrapolate this data
to determine the current and future security of the network given past software vulnerability frequencies. As the attack graphs are displayed in near real time, an administrator can change the
network topology slightly, recompute the graphs for the new topology, and compare the graphs
produced from different configurations. This allows an administrator to weigh network security
against other factors, such as hardware costs and ease of maintenance. Finally, NETSPA imports
information from several existing security and network planning tools. Existing network configuration information can be obtained through the use of tools such as nmap, Nessus, and NetViz.
Online databases such as ICAT and the Nessus vulnerability plug-ins provide valuable information about attack requirements and effects [16]. Construction of an attack graph requires several
pieces of information about the type of attacker, underlying network topology, number of attacks
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available to the attacker, and their types. Figure 4.6 illustrates these input components.

Figure 4.6: Necessary information to create an attack graph [16]

Only three inputs (the attack model, network and host vulnerabilities, and network topology) are
essential to the creation of a useful attack graph. The attack model defines the state transition
relation of an attack by stating its requirements and effects of executing an attack. The network
topology limits the physical paths that an attacker can traverse within the network, subject to
network connectivity and firewall rules. The host and network vulnerabilities and configurations
define the possible set of initial actions that the attacker can take against the network using attacks
from the attack model. The other three inputs to the attack graph (attacker profiles, intrusion
detection systems, and critical network resources) are not required to generate an attack graph,
however they increase the utility of the constructed graph. The attacker profile defines the starting
state of the intruder, as well as the methodology that he uses in choosing the next attack to execute.
This enables the administrator to optimize a network’s security against novice outside attackers,
while accepting the possibility of an insider attack. A list of critical network resources also allows
the security administrator to prune the complete attack graph to only those states which are judged
critical, such as not allowing attacker access to a central billing database. Finally, the placement
and type of the intrusion detection systems allow the graph generator to determine which paths are
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visible.
NETSPA was created to fill a void in existing security software. The primary design goal of
NETSPA was to create a system that could automatically compute complete attack graphs for real,
user-specified networks. This, in turn, lead to three separate sub-goals: allow a user to easily
define a network and its resulting configuration, enable quick modeling of realistic actions, and
efficiently compute worst-case attack graphs with sufficient meta-information to be easily useful
to the user. Secondary to the notion of attack graphs was that of simplicity and information reuse,
most notably in the action specifications. The worst-case graphs generated by NETSPA illustrate
all possible cyber-attack paths. They do not model physical attacks or human engineering attacks.
Graph generation does not take into account the skill or predisposition of the attacker. It also
assumes that attempts at "security by obscurity," such as passing SMTP traffic through the firewall
on a non-standard port, fail. In addition, the model of an IDS is assumed to be "best-case." A
host-based IDS always detects an attack launched against it, while a network-based IDS always
detects attacks that are visible on the network if it has a signature for the attack. NETSPA is
divided into several modules to achieve its goals, each component and resulting connectivity is
shown in Figure 4.7. As seen in the upper left of the figure and illustrated, the software database
is the repository of software information used by NETSPA to make software names consistent.
The software database is used by both the action database and the input filters to the network
model to create a consistent software naming scheme among network configuration and action
definitions. The action database shown in the middle left of figure contains information about
every possible action that an attacker can execute against a user-defined network. The creation
of this network is aided by the use input filters, shown in the upper right of 4.7, which populate
the network model with network configuration information. This network model is then used to
create an initial network state, which is provided, along with the database of possible actions and
set of existing trust relationships, to the computation engine. The computation engine then creates

96

a worst-case attack graph for the specific set of inputs [16].

Figure 4.7: NetSpa component diagram [16]

Multihost, Multistage, Vulnerability Analysis

Multihost, multistage, Vulnerability Analysis (MuLVAl) project was developed at Kansas State
University as a research tool to better manage the configuration of an enterprise network. Xinming
Ou, Govindavajhala, and Appel discuss that MulVAL uses Datalog as the artifical language for
the elements in the analysis [159]. The inputs to MulVAL’s analysis are reported vulnerabilitis or
advisors, host configuration, network configuration, the network users or principals, and policies
like access levels. Figure 4.8 shows MulVAl framework.
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Figure 4.8: The MulVAL framework [159]

The reasoning engine in MulVAL can handle the network size and perform analysis for thousands
of machines. For scalability, MuLVal was tested on up to 2000 hosts. The scanners can execute
in parallel on multiple machines. The analysis engine then operates on the data collected from all
hosts. The OVAL scanner collects machine configuration information and compares the configuration with formal advisories to assess for vulnerabilities existence on a system. However, when
a new advisory comes, the scanning will have to be repeated on each host which is not the most
desirable technique. OVAL language is an XML-based language for specifying machine configuration tests. MulVAL runs efficiently for networks with thousands of hosts, and it has found
security problems in a real network [159]. MulVal is an open source and that gives an advantage
to academic researchers.

Conclusion

Predicting total security on a given time is still a challenging task, and blocking sophisticated
threats or advanced malware attacks is still less effective [158]. Attack graphs representation approaches had several developments since 1996 from enumeration approach to hybrid condition
with exploit oriented approach and vulnerability oriented approach [135]. Good strides in ad98

dressing scalability and network vulnerability analysis were made, yet, there is till need to address
complex large enterprise and multiple stage attacks. Those complex networks demand automatic
expert system to analyze network topology, show exploitation scenarios, and rank relevant subgraphs to determine security measures that need to be deployed first. In addition, future research
should improve the application of graph attacks algorithms by decreasing their complexity. Finally,
there is also a need for research designs of security systems to better integrate and automate Cyber
Situational Awareness.
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CHAPTER 5: A GENERIC SCHEME FOR CYBERSECURITY IN
RESOURCE CONSTRAINT NETWORK USING INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION GAME

Introduction

In the communication networks, exploitation of vulnerabilities in the individual nodes and their
subsequent networks caused by the malicious affects severely to the performance and efficiency
of the communication process. In general, such exploitation are mitigated by a defense system
that includes preventive controls such as block threats and prevent incidents, detective controls
such generating alerts of detected threats, forensic controls such as collecting threats’ activities,
and audit controls such as investigating presence of threat and operations of controls that mitigate
risks [53]. This defense system works with the authoritative network agents to detect and prevent
suspicious activities in the network. The agents are the resource constraint nodes that participate in
the resource constraint communication such as wireless network communication. Human or some
smart algorithm always controls the behavior of the agents which may be cooperative or malicious.
Traditional defense systems are built on the mathematical optimization techniques [106, 8], those
are less likely to capture the effects of the attacker’s behavior in the model. Consequently, the
resource of the defender system gets wasted in defending the network by misidentifying incidents
or false positives and developing a response.
Generally, two types of systems are implemented for the defense system to prevent the loss in
resource due to false alarm: (1) a lightweight monitoring system [28], and (2) an intrusion detection
and prevention system (IDPS) [13]. However, the IDPS consumes enough resources compared
to the lightweight monitoring system. Under a standard protocol, the resource constraint agents
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deploy the lightweight monitoring system to check for any malicious activity in the network instead
of using the IDPS to save the resource. Once the attack is confirmed, the IDPS is activated to defend
the system. To correctly enable the IDPS, the defense system needs to study the behavior of the
communicating agents over time and learn their behavior. Several game theoretic techniques [26,
136, 62, 238, 241, 35, 18, 224, 157] are developed to tackle this situation. In particular, noncooperative game theory [151] that models the competitive nature of the agents in the absence of
any binding agreements provides a generic framework for developing various defensive algorithms
to study the interactions among the attackers and the defenders. In the following, we represent a
standard network security game (also called the network intrusion detection and prevention game)
that models such interactions among the nodes in a wireless communication network.
In this chapter, we build a game theoretic model to prevent wastage of resource. We assume that
the defense system has resource constraints, and that each false alarm consumes a large amount
of resource and time in defending it. Thus, our objective is to ensure that the activation of the
defense system is done only when it is absolutely necessary. In the proposed model, we consider a
lightweight monitoring system (LMS) and a heavyweight monitoring and prevention defense system (HMPDS). Hence, the strategy profile either activates the HMPDS or LMS. We also assume
that the defender has no prior information regarding the attacker until the attacker starts communicating. We allow sufficient randomization of the attacker behavior that completely confuses the
defender agent. To handle such an attacker, we make a balance between the exploitation and the exploration concept of the learning algorithm. Each defender explores the environment and chooses
a strategy profile to exploit the attacker. Exploration is done through the lightweight traffic monitoring system. Thus, the concept of exploration prevents the defender from converging to the local
maxima of the problem due to the unknown nature of the attacker.
To capture the behavior of both the defender and the attacker model, we model the interaction
between them as a stochastic game. In the process, we find the Nash Equilibrium (NE) for the
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interaction. However, if the game is a one-sided game in which an attacker plays any strategy that
has adverse effects on the network, the defender will learn and play the best response available
strategy. So, in the model, the attacker and defender may play the equilibrium strategy or defender
will play a best response strategy based on the nature of the attacker. In short, the proposed
technique will help in finding the global maxima of the strategy profile. We confirm through
numerical simulation that the proposed algorithm called as Learning Algorithm for Incomplete
Information Game (LAIIG) easily captures attacker behavior even if the attacker randomizes its
strategy.

Background and Related Work

In the standard network security game, the players are ideally represented by the attackers and
defenders. The action spaces of the attackers and the defenders are the sets of attacking and defensive countermeasures, respectively. The values of the cost (payoff) values quantify the outcomes
of each player in the game for all action and reaction combinations. The actions of the attacker
and the defender are mapped to a specific cost (payoff) value u, representing the gain or loss of
each player for each branch of the game after it is played. In Table 5.1, we present the game theoretic terminologies representing the parameters and their actions for network security in a resource
constraint communication network.
A network security game G which provides basic insights to the decision-making under security threats and the interactions among the attackers and the defenders can be formulated as follows[151]. Take a network which is monitored by an intrusion detection system and targeted by
malicious attackers. In the simplest case, the action set of the attacker A p is SA p = {a, na }, where
a denotes “launching an attack” on the network and na denotes “no attack”. The action set of the
defender D p , is SD p = {d, nd }, where d denotes “having intensified monitoring”, and nd denotes
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Table 5.1: Terminologies representing the parameters
Symbols
G
A p, D p
SA p , SD p
Xi
Vi
πi

Definition
The Network Security Game
Attacker and Defender Agent
Action set for Agent A p and D p
Rewards or feedback from the environment for an agent i
Estimated value of the rewards for an agent i
Policy profile of an agent i

“default response”, i.e., “no major defensive action”. Adopting a non zero-sum formulation, the
game matrix takes the following form:

d

nd





a  −α, β

na 0, −β f

b , −βb 
α

0, 0

(5.1)

b , and βb are positive real numbers. Each entry in the game matrix is
where the quantities α, β , α
given by utility function over SA p × SD p .
Definition 5.0.1. The action profile (s∗i , s∗j ) where i ∈ A p , j ∈ D p is the Nash Equilibrium (NE)
of the network security game G=({A p , D p },{SA p ,SD p },u(si , s j )si ∈SA p ,s j ∈SD p ), if ui (s∗i , s∗j ) ≥ ui (si , s∗j )
and u j (s∗i , s∗j ) ≥ u j (s∗i , s j ).
We take α to be the cost incurred by attacker A p when the defender D p defends the system and β
b is the benefit
as the benefit of the defender when she successfully averts the attack. The quantity α
of attacker A p when she successfully penetrates the system causing a loss of βb to defender D p .
The quantity β f is the cost incurred by the defender D p because of false alarm. The game can be
described as follows: for any positive α, A p is forced to play na as it is the best response strategy.
Similarly, D p ’s strategy will depend on the relative value of β f and βb. If β f ≤ βb, the best response
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strategy for D p will be d, otherwise she plays nd . Considering all the outcomes for the game G,
we deduced the Nash Equilibrium strategy profile of the game as (na , nd ).
A common criticism of the standard network security game is that it is both static and deterministic.
Therefore, it is difficult to capture the complexities and the unknown properties of the underlying
network system. For example, consider that two agents are communicating in a stochastic environment and are unaware of the underlying game (mainly the NE), i.e., they are not observing each
other. For example, suppose defender sees that it is getting a reward +4 while following its first
strategy and compensation - 5 while accomplishing the second action. As time passes and attacker
changes its policy, the defender observes a switch in the utility associated with each strategy: the
first strategy now has a reward of -2 and second action reward of +3. Note that in both cases, the
defender is unaware of its own Nash equilibrium strategy and depends on the policy of Attackers. The only feedback defender is getting is the change in its reward function, which depends
on the attacker’s policy. The same situation would apply in reverse to the attacker if the defender
randomized its policy.
Due to the dynamic nature of the interactions among the attackers and the defenders, several techniques are proposed to model the network security problem under the stochastic game theoretic
frameworks. In [146] an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is identified with a stochastic game between the attacker and the defender. In this model, the edges of a directed graph help in capturing
the influence of an agent (node) to other nodes in the network. The model combines pure strategies
of players in the game to define the state and transition probabilities. It also correlates vulnerability
with security assets. In [239], a Q learning approach is defined to determine the optimal policies
of the defender followed by a proposal to learn the behavior of the attacker. It assumes the perfect
information structure of the stochastic game. In [130] a nonlinear program is used to compute the
Nash equilibrium of the stochastic game. However, all these techniques are based on a game with
perfect information, whereas in practice, the attacker and the defender often cannot fully observe
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each other’s moves and predict the evolution of the underlying system. Each player has only limited information on the opponent’s specific objectives. Hence, the game is more analogous to the
strategy board games of Risk or Strategy rather than chess. Researchers use framework such as
Bayesian game with chance moves [138], learning schemes [43], or Fuzzy games [7] for modeling
such limited information game. Because of the limitation on observation and availability of the
information, individuals act deceptively or lie about their intentions.
The works of [66, 101] use the Bayesian game framework. However, the cyberspace creates unique
opportunities for deception to the attacker. An attacker can leverage the information asymmetry
to misinform and mislead any defense system. Thus, the attacker can strategically manipulate private information to suit her self-interest. She then reveals the manipulated information to deceive
the defender node. In other ways, they play an unstructured game between the attacker and the
defender node. In this setup, there is an exogenous constraint on deception; i.e., it is easy for the
sender to lie rather than revealing the truth. Therefore, the defender node needs to form a correct
belief based on past observations, taking into account the potential damage caused by deception,
and strategically use the observed information.

Methods

Problem Definition

The problem of activating the correct action by the defender is similar to learning a moving target.
We extend the game G to capture the dynamic of interaction between the agents. We consider an
environment with two players of the type A p or D p . Each player i has a finite set of actions Si . According to the action chosen at any time t by the player, nature reciprocates with a random reward
Xt ∈ R as feedback to the player, and she enters into some unknown state zt ∈ Z. The transition
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probability from one state of Z to another is also unknown to the players. This environment is justified because attacking agents are presumed to have unpredictable behavior with an unstructured
reward for the action. Thus, we redefine the network security game G as a stochastic game.
Definition 5.0.2. The network security game G is defined as a two players game of with tuple


(Si )i∈{A p ,D p } , Z, Xt (zi , ·)i∈{A p ,D p },z∈Z where Xt = Z × ∏ j∈{A p ,D p } a j and a j ∈ Si .
The model defined, essentially captures the interactions between an attacker and a defender in the
security network and provides a quantitative and systematic understanding of the attacker. Under
this framework, we define the policy profile π = {πi |i ∈ {A p , D p }} as follows. The policy profile
of agent i given by πi is a probability distribution over Si , which changes/updates with time. Thus,
finally we have,

πi = {pa |P(a), ∀a ∈ Si }

where ∑a∈Si pa = 1.
Definition 5.0.3. The policy profile (πA∗ p , πD∗ p ) is the Nash equilibrium policy profile of the game
G if Xt (πA∗ p , πD∗ p ) ≥ Xt (πA∗ p , πD p ) and Xt (πA∗ p , πD p ∗) ≥ Xt (πA p , πD∗ p ).
Definition 5.0.4. The strategy profile πi∗ ∈ BR(·) iff Xt (πi∗ , ·) ≥ Xt (πi , ·) where BR is the best
response of the agent i for any action played by its opponents player.
The purpose of the defender’s agent is to find a policy profile π to exaggerate their expected
rewards, which is a Nash Equilibrium or the best response. The decision to discover the Nash
equilibrium or best reply depends on the agent attacking the defender for the Stochastic game
G. In case of interaction between the two rational agents, the designed method will attend to a
Nash Equilibrium. Else if the competitor agent of the defender takes advantage of the incomplete
information statue of the defender agent, then the defender will find the best strategy profile.
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Methodology

The solution to the problem stated in Section Problem Definition finally boils down to a distributed
online learning algorithm in the stochastic environment for the multi-agent system. We let the
defender to run free in a world as shown in Figure 5.1. The agent does not know the state, the
rewards, and the transition. She interacts with the other agents, makes random or informed actions
and learns the value of her action. We allow the agents to explore and exploit the environment
while communicating with the other agents. To facilitate this, we use the concept of temporal
learning with baseline concept to deduce the global maxima policy which all the agents follow
while interacting with the environment.

Figure 5.1: Learning through a feedback network from the environment. Feedback network helps
the individual agent to read the status of her own action and help in deciding the course of action
and policy

Following the Definition 5.0.2, we denote the action selected by agent D p at time t by a and the
corresponding rewards as Xt (feedback form the environment). The expected rewards x(a) given
by an action a if selected by D p is given by

x(a) = E [Xt |a]
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(5.2)

Assuming that the value of each action is uncertain, we estimate the action value of each agent at
time t and denote the estimated value by Vti (a) where i ∈ D p such that
To estimate the action value Vti (a), we concentrate on a single action a. Let Xt be the rewards of
the action a after the t-th epoch (iteration), then Vti (a), after (t − 1) epochs is given by
Vti (a) =

1 t−1
∑ Xk
t − 1 k=1

(5.3)


1
i
i
= Vt−1
(a) +
Xt−1 −Vt−1
(a)
t −1
According to the above equation, each agent will update its estimation of action value for every
timestamp based on the temporal difference learning algorithm of the form:
New Utility ← Old Utility + Learning Rate [ Target Utility − Old Utility ].
The equation (5.3) is written as


i
i
Vti (a) = Vt−1
(a) + α Xt−1 −Vt−1
(a)

where α is Learning Rate usually lies between 0 and 1. An important significant of the equation
(5.3) is that the value V equals the reward x by the law of large numbers for infinite epochs, i.e.,

lim V i (a) = x(a)
t→∞ t

Consider Vti as value estimate of an agent i for using all action at time t; we calculate the policy
profile πi using soft-max distribution [61] as follows:

i

πi {pa |P(a), ∀a ∈ Si } =
108

eVt /τ
i

∑c eVt (c)/τ

(5.4)

where τ is the temperature that controls the exploration and exploitation over the policies. At every
epoch, there is at least an action whose V is greatest. If we select the agent with the most significant
V ’s value, we are exploiting that strategy. However, due to the random rewards obtained, we will
allow the agent to explore other strategies. We use simulated annealing approach for an agent to
learn other agents. Here, τ is the simulated annealing temperature, which we control over time.
The updating rule of the preference from time t to t + 1 is given by Theorem 5.0.1.
Theorem 5.0.1. Assuming that the preference value Vti is incremented proportional to the performance of the action, the updating rule for Vti is given by
i
Vt+1
(a) = Vti (a) + α(Xt −Vti (a))(1a=k − pti (a))

(5.5)

where α ∈ [0, 1] is the step-size parameter and 1a=k is 1 if k = a else 0.
Proof. We represent the increment of Vti (a) by a stochastic gradient ascent algorithm we have,
i
Vt+1
(a) = Vti (a) + α

∂ E [Xt ]
∂Vti (a)

where
E[Xt ] = ∑ pti (k)(x(k))
k

It follows that,
∂
∂Vti (a)

"

#

∑ pti (k)x(k) = ∑ x(k)
k

k

∂ pti (k)
∂Vti (a)

(5.6)

As the V changes, the probability of selecting each action changes, however, the sum of changes
is zero, i.e.,
∂ pti (k)
∑ ∂V i(a) = 0
t
k
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We can rewrite the above equation as

∂
∂Vti (a)

"

#

∑ pti (k)x(k) = ∑(x(k) − b)
k

k

∂ pti (k)
∂Vti (a)

where b is any scalar independent of x.
Using the standard quotient rule for derivative and Eq.(5.4) we have,

"
#
i
∂
eVt (a)/τ
∂ pti (k)
=
∂Vti (a) ∂Vti (a) ∑c eVti (c)/τ
i

=

∂ eVt (c)/τ
∂Vti (a)

i

i

∑c eVt (b)/τ − eVt (b)/τ

2
i (c)/τ
V
t
e
∑c

i

∂ ∑c eVt (c)/τ
∂Vti (a)

= (1a=k − pti (a))pti (k)

Then, Eq.(5.6) becomes,

∂
∂Vti (a)

"

#

∑ pti (k)x(k)
k

= ∑(x(k) − b)(1a=k − pti (a))pti (k)
k

= ∑(x(k) − b)pti (k)(1a=k − pti (a))
k



= E (Xt − b)(1a=k − pti (a))
Thus, the stochastic gradient ascent algorithm for the action a for a single iteration with the baseline

110

of Vti (a) is
i
Vt+1
(a) = Vti (a) + α(Xt −Vti (a))(1a=k − pti (a))

This completes the proof.

Algorithm (2) in the following uses the above update rule to derive the optimal policy for an agent
i.
Algorithm 2 Learning Algorithm for Incomplete Information Game (LAIIG) learns the optimal
policy of the agent in Network Security Game.
Find the Optimal Policy Initialize V , p arbitrarily each t Select an action based on the policy
profile πi . Update the estimate value: Vt+1 (a) ← Vt (a) + α(Xt −Vt (a))(1a=k − pt (a)) Update the
Vt+1 (a)/τ
policy profile: pt+1 (a) ← e Vt+1 (b)/τ
∑b e

To control the exploration and exploitation of the algorithm, we set the temperature τ =

1
log(n)

where n increases with each loop in the algorithm with an initial value of 1. After that, we allow
τ to decrease by a small amount gradually as in the simulated annealing process. It facilitates
greater exploration in the beginning by the defender agent. But, as time passes, the temperature
decreases, so the defender’s agent increases the exploitation and decreases the exploration by the
agent. This model will prove to be more efficient than the one with a fixed temperature of τ. Again,
the baseline V controls the policy value. For example, at any time, t, if the baseline is non-zero,
the probability of selecting an action/strategy increases if the baseline value is less than the actual
reward received. If the reward earned is less than the baseline value, the probability of selecting
the action decreases.
Lemma 5.0.2. The policy profile π given by LAIIG for the network security game G converges to
the Nash Equilibrium (NE).

Proof. Note that Algorithm 2 chooses strategies based on the distribution given by Eq.(5.4) which
asserts that the probability of not selecting the best response decreases with a decrease in the value
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of τ. So, when τ → 0, the likelihood of choosing the best response converges to 1. Following [9],
there exists a potential game [139] for G which eventually converges to the Nash equilibrium
[188].

Numerical Simulation

To check the performance and the behavior of our model, we implement Algorithm 2. The environment created for testing the algorithm comprised of one defender’s agent and an unknown
behavior agent. It is assumed that the payoff matrix for the Network Defense game G is the matrix
in (Table 5.2). In the matrix, the defender agent (D p ) has strategy SD p = {nd , d}, where nd is
the LMS and d is the HMPDS. The attacker agent (A p ) will follow SA p = {a1 , a2 , a3 , na } where
a1, a2 , a3 are attacking strategy. It is assumed that the quantum of consequent for an attack is the
order of strategy a1 , a2 , and a3 . The strategy na is the strategy of good behavior (non-attacker)
agent. Let πA p = {pa1 , pa2 , pa3 , pna } and πD p = {pnd , pd } be the policy profile of agent A p and D p
where pa1 , pa2 , pa3 , pna , pna , pd are the probability of selecting the strategy a1 , a2 , a3 , na , nd , and d
respectively. We assume a1 has the highest negative impact on the defender node comparing to
a2 , and a3 . Also, we assume that a2 has a more powerful negative influence than a3 . The na is a
strategy where the attacker is a cooperative agent.

Table 5.2: Payoff of Matrix used for numerical simulation

a1
a
Attacker Agent 2
a3
na

Defender Agent
nd
d
(2, −3) (−3, −1)
(1, −2) (−2, −1)
(0.5, −1) (−1, −1)
(0, 0)
(0, −1)
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Each entry in the Table is the amount of utility obtained when the attacker and defender agent
choose an action. For example, the entry (2, −3) is the payoff received by the attacker and defender
node when the attacker takes strategy a1 and defender select action nd . Value 2 is the quantity
measuring the advantage by the attacker when the defender does not defend who, in turn, gets a
value of -3. Similarly, in the entry (−3, −1), the defender agent gets -1 when successfully defended
the attacker, and who obtains a payoff of -3. Value -3 signified that the attacker is caught by the
defender while attacking the network. The following scenarios are considered for testing LAIIG
with the payoff matrix (Table 5.2).

• Scenario 1: Interaction between two rational agents following LAIIG.
• Scenario 2: Interaction between a cooperative agent with a defender agent following LAIIG.
• Scenario 3: Interaction between an agent with a 50% chance of attacking and a defender
agent with LAIIG.
• Scenario 4: Interaction between an attacker who randomizes its strategy and a defender agent
following LAIIG.

During the implementation, the performance is verified by changing the various value of the stepsize (α). We consider cases when α = 1/n, and α ∈ [0, 0.1], where n is the number of times the
action is selected by agent i. The values of step-size (α) are chosen to satisfy the following two
constraints [88]:
∞

∑ αt = ∞

t=1
∞

∑ αt2 < ∞

t=1

Accordingly, we select the value of the step-size α =

1
n

that satisfies the above constraints. How-

ever, during the simulation, it is shown that the algorithm performs better when α is a constant
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(i.e., it meets the first constraint) with the value in the range [0, 0.1] in our environment.

Figure 5.2: Policy profile π for two agents under different situation when α = 0.01.

In scenario 1, both agents are learning agents. Both agents work for improving the rewards
achieved by enhancing the policy profile for strategy selection. Both agents converse to their
optimal strategy before 200 iterations as shown in Figure 5.2. It is, in fact, much better than the
existed algorithm, as shown in Figure 5.3. LAIIG allows the agent to decrease the usability of a
strategy if the strategy yields an unsatisfied result. The defender agent dealt with a neutral/good
behavior agent in scenario 2. Initially, the defender agent explores its strategy until 600 iterations
as shown in Figure 5.2. During this phase, the defender agent gradually increased the usability of
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Figure 5.3: Performance comparison with existing algorithms for learning in the game

the strategy nd as it proceeded with the game. After 600 steps, the defender agent exploited the
best/optimal strategy nd .
In scenario 3 and 4, the defender agent interacted with the opponent agent who randomized their
strategy. In case of the situation 3, the defender learned the plan for its opponent, who is plying
115

Figure 5.4: Cumulative payoff for two agents when α = 0.1.

the policy πA p = {0.5, 0, 0, 0.5}. As a result, the defender policy profile πD p value is lay between
0.4 and 0.6. Similarly, the policy profile value for the defender agent lies between 0.3 to 0.7
in scenario 4, where the defender agent interacted with the opponents having the policy profile
πA p = {0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25}. Two scenarios showed that LAIIG could handle the situation where
the opponent player randomizes their strategy to confuse the defender agent.
Figure 5.4 shows the payoff of the defender for the scenarios discussed above. In case 1 and case
2, the payoff for the defender fluctuates before 200 steps and 600 steps, respectively, as she was
learning the behavior of the attacker agent/node. But in case 2 and 4, because of random action of
the attacker’s agent, its payoff fluctuate between value 0.0 and -3.0. From the above discussion,

116

we conclude that LAIIG converged to the optimal policy, whatever the strategy or behavior of the
opponent.

Conclusion

The chapter solves the problem of a network security game when the defender has incomplete
information about the attacker’s action profile. In our model, the defender keeps on updating her
belief in the form of policy profile so that, based on the policy profile, she decides whether to
activate her network defense resources. Comparing to other algorithms which solve such incomplete information game between the rational agent, we prove through simulation that LAIIG works
better. We also confirm from the numerical analysis of the algorithm that the algorithm converges.
The algorithm worked for an attacker that deployed one strategy at a time. The scenario will
change if the multiple types of attacks happen from a single attacker or multiple attackers, which
we leave for future work.
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CHAPTER 6: MACHINE LEARNING IN CYBERSECURITY

Introduction

Cybersecurity combines a set of strategies and systems to defend and protect confidentiality, integrity and availability of uncurrupted data, systems and services. It is complex because it consists
of various elements and layers such as networks, systems, hosts, personnel, privacy, etc. [113]. Today’s necessity for systems and data to be available digitally, and to be accessible online, increases
bad actors’ persistent attempts to breach them. Hence, cyber defenders must be prepared with
training, tools, policies and strategies to face attacks that can come from outside or inside security
perimeters. They also need to capitalize on the latest research in cybersecurity as it is growing. One
side of this research is machine learning that is becoming popular after its promises in other fields,
such as pattern recognition, computer vision, image identification, intrusion detection, e tc. [126].
The traditional idea of defense that depends on known signatures to identify and detect an attack
needs much improvement, especially that they make a defense of zero-day attacks impossible [71].
Attackers’ motives are numerous, and they change their payloads and attack vectors which makes
predicting all of them a serious task. Authors in [48] argued that the machine learning solution
is not a silver bullet and asks two questions: (1) Can an algorithm reliably find the needle in the
haystack? (2) Can such an algorithm increase our confidence in the absence of an attack? In a case
study of PayPal by [141], it is shown that the PayPal mitigate fraud losses below industry averages
by teaching computers to play a detective. As a transaction is being made, PayPal’s deep-learning
algorithms can search 16 years of users’ purchasing history and thousands of fraud patterns to spot
theft while evading error. Besides, it makes the case that artificial intelligence and deep learning
as the only approach to catch up to cyber threats.
Authors of [175] surveyed machine learning techniques and discussed issues associated with them.
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The majority of traditional machine learning methods are not efficient at working with large scales
of large and different types and volumes of data. Therefore, there is a need for machine learning to
improve for big data handling. Moreover, we can understand that machine learning challenges will
add to the challenges of cybersecurity. So, based on the latest publications, how machine learning
can facilitate prediction of the future attacks? How can it detect vulnerabilities? Will it be able to
assist in human error and weak designs? How can it be robust and withstand deceptions? What
can defenders do to defend against hackers using machine learning in attacks? Per [176], machine
learning is defined as a branch of computer science aimed at empowering computers with the help
of designed algorithms to learn about behaviors based on empirical data. A common example of
programs that employ machine learning include e-mail spam filters. In [82], authors stated that
when machine learning is applied to cybersecurity, it makes it smarter because it moves beyond
the traditional cat-and-mouse game. The attackers use cloaking techniques and alias IP addresses
which are outside whitelists, blacklists, and basic code matching that cat-and-mouse depend on.
Per [240], large data volumes allow for various analyses for the purpose of organization’s management and support of the decision-making. Hence, such optimization helps to reduce time to
respond to risks in cybersecurity field. This chapter purpose is a 360◦ look at machine learning
application in cybersecurity. It considers human role in the quest of using the machine learning in
cybersecurity; machine learning techniques; and challenges.

Data to Goals

Knowledge to Wisdom

Human role is changing with the advances in technology and it is important to understand how
a machine learning affect human interaction. In fact, cyber teams’ effectiveness may be affected
negatively if that understanding is poor. For example, missing true positives or acting on too many
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false positives can happen if a human is fully trusting a machine. Currently, the defense systems
that eliminate human’s understanding and decision do not exist. In the past, human does most of
the digging in data. Lately, machine learning is processing data and information and human is not
as involved with those stages, yet human need to act on the gained knowledge. A basic hierarchy
of understanding is DIKW (Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom) which we can be applied in
this context is shown in Figure 6.1. Many variants of DIKW exist [235].

Figure 6.1: Apply DIKW to cybersecurity

When relations are grasped in data it becomes information, the latter becomes knowledge when
patterns are understood. Final stage is to act on established knowledge to achieve goals in the
wisdom stage. Processes of capturing, collecting, organizing, clustering, classifying, analyzing,
and optimizing can be automated. Human role is still essential in acting on goals to make sure
enterprise systems are secure. Machine learning papers often focus on extracting information
from data in order to establish knowledge, discuss algorithm limitations and skip human learning
discussion. This version of DIKW is helpful to close that gap.
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Data to Knowledge

The subject of Data Science is to retrieve knowledge from data. The latter is interdisciplinary and
integrates computer science, statistics, machine learning, artificial intelligence, etc. A common
data science process includes (1) discovery of raw data and curing it to store in data repositories.
This process involves discovery, acquisition, and preparation. (2) Selection and acquisition of curated data from data repositories for data analysis, (3) data analysis, (4) results interpretation, and
(5) Result publication and optionally operationalization of the pipeline for continuous analyses
[29]. An alternative view to data science is knowledge discovery in databases (KDD) that utilizes
(1) data recording, (2) data cleaning and storage, (4) data analysis through statistics, or AI, or data
mining, (4) data interpretation, and (5) decision making. KDD is an iterative and interactive process that works on previously unknown and potentially useful knowledge from data. This makes
KDD useful for fraud detection, telecommunication, marketing, etc. Data Mining is KDD’s core
to understand phenomena from the data, analysis it and prediction.
Two basic methodologies are supported by the data processing tools: Schema-on-Write (used in
traditional databases with table’s schema imposed during the data load time) and Schema-on-Read
(alternative data storage with schema used during reading). Data lakes is one area of interest and
it is a repository for original data (structured, unstructured and semi-structured). Data lakes operate schema-on-read-based that have less restricted architecture to store data [214]. The elements
in data lakes are distinctively identified and tagged with a set of comprehensive metadata tags.
The tools to transform data lakes into data vaults (schema-on-read data lake into a schema-onwrite data) and then into data warehouses (centralizes and consolidates large amounts of data from
multiple sources) are summarized in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1: Tools for data lakes transformation, based on [214]
Tool
Apache Spark
Spark Core
Spark SQL
Spark Streaming
Spark MLib
GraphX
Akka
Apache Cassandra
Apache Kafka
Kafka Streams
Kafka Connect
Elasticsearch
R
Scala
Python
MQ Telemetry
Transport

Brief Description
Open source cluster computing framework
Provides distributed task dispatching, scheduling, and basic I/O functionalities
Presents Spark module for structured data processing
An extension of the core Spark API to perform
streaming analytics
Spark’s machine learning library
Graph processing application programming interface (API)
Implementation of the Actor Model on the JVM
Open source database management system
Open-source stream-processing software platform
A client library to build applications and store
in Kafka clusters
Enables data processing capabilities between
Apache Kafka and other data systems
A search and analytics engine
Statistical and computing programming language and software environment
General-purpose programming language
Programming language
Simple and lightweight messaging (ISO/IEC
20922) protocol Protocol
Opportunities in Cybersecurity

Ontologies

Ontologies formally conceptualize knowledge domain with complex relationships and rules to
infer new statements automatically. Ontology engineering can help with automated data processing
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to meet cybersecurity demands [193]. An ontology can be interpreted by machines and includes
properties of concepts, relationships, functions, restrictions and axioms. In digital forensics, an
ontology allows an examiner to obtain conclusive evidence, and justify stored information. Hence,
an ontology includes definitions of basic concepts in the domain that a machine can interpret.
Authors [153] explain benefits behind developing an ontology:

• People or software agents can use it to share the common understanding of the structure of
information.
• Allow flexibility to adopt domain knowledge by various researchers.
• Allow flexibility to change assumptions if knowledge domain changes .
• To distinguish between a product ad product by being able to separate operational knowledge
from domain knowledge.
• To have a toll with comprehensive depiction of domain knowledge and being able to analyze
it.

They also stated that the literature of Artificial Intelligence (AI) contains different definitions of an
ontology that often contradict one another.
The Semantic Web is a framework co-designed by Sir Tim Berners-Lee that builds upon the World
Wide Web (2001). The Semantic Web is seen as a natural evolution of the WWW. What makes the
Semantic Web new and different are the semantically meaningful tags used to describe content on
the web. The trend is adopting dynamically generated and interpreted logic within the World Wide
Web Consortium (W3C) definitions for semantic technologies [21]. All of these semantic tags
connect back to an ontology. An ontology intended for Semantic Web applications is implemented
in the Web Ontology Language (OWL) standard [22]. This standard is maintained by the World
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Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and is freely available. A popular choice for implementing OWL
ontologies is the XML-based Resource Description Framework (RDF) language. RDF is based on
XML as an attempt to make better use of metadata (data about data) by extending into relationships
of the data [92]. If I use my computer to express my data in standards compliant XML, your
computer will be able to parse the data. XML achieves syntactic interoperability. Below are
different ontologies and brief descriptions:

• Reference Ontology for Cybersecurity Operational Information: structures cybersecurity information and orchestrates industry specifications from the viewpoint of cybersecurity operations [206].
• Security Ontology (SO): SO (upper ontology) can model risk assessment knowledge, abstraction of security requirements, reusable security knowledge interoperability, aggregation
and reasoning [193, 70].
• Security Asset Vulnerability Ontology (SAVO): SAVO (upper ontology) links high-level
concepts such as security policies and security goals with low-level technical counter measures in order to separate security requirements from their implementations matched on the
required actions [193, 218].
• Security Algorithm-Standard Ontology (SASO): SASO (upper ontology) encompasses security algorithms, standards, concepts, credentials, objectives, assurance levels, etc. [218,
193, 217].
• Unified Cybersecurity Ontology (UCO): (UCO) is an extension to Intrusion Detection System ontology (IDS). Provides a common understanding of cybersecurity domain, and unifies
most commonly used cybersecurity standards [193, 204].
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• Cyber Ontology of MITRE: Focused primarily on malware and some preliminary aspects of
the so-called (diamond model), which includes actors, victims, infrastructure [193, 156].
• Incidence Response and Threat Intelligence Ontology: Ontology can provide the basis for
calculating IT costs, analyze the impact of a particular threat, potential countermeasures, and
their benefits [58]
• Ontology for Insider Threat Indicators: Bridges the gap between natural language descriptions of malicious insiders, malicious insider activity, and machine-generated data that analysts and investigators use to detect behavioral and technical observable of insider activity
[47].
• Ontology for Threat Intelligence: Ontology implements the widely adopted intrusion kill
chain of Lockheed-Martin [65].
• Ontology for Digital Forensics in IT Security Incidents: Its goal is to make it easier to
investigate security incidents [223].
• Cyber Effects Simulation Ontology (CESO): Built to model and simulate the System of
Systems effects of a cyber attack on an organization or military unit [155].
• Network Ontology (NetOnto): Domain network ontology for cybersecurity an ontology designed to describe exchanged BGP routes [109].
• SCADA Ontology (OSCIDS): A knowledge-based system that utilizes ontology to extract
semantic relations among attacks and detect intrusions [6].
• Measurement Ontology for IP Traffic: Ontology comprises all aspects of the IP measurement
domain, Data ontology as well as a Metadata ontology, Upper ontology and an Anonymization ontology. [187].
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• MonONTO:Ontology for an expert system for network monitoring and for application performance recommendation [140].

Intrusion Detection Systems

Intrusion detection system’s (IDS) role is to dynamically monitor a computer system or network
for unauthorized events; and IDS task is complex because of the high volume of traffic it needs
to capture and classify to anomaly or misuse behaviors [234]. Anomaly detection use techniques
to detect malicious behavior or unfamiliar intrusions, so it reflects on a normal system profile or
network usage. Misuse detection depends on capturing and identifying known signatures. The latter are rules input by administrators or pre-configured in the system. Anomaly detection may not
be widely used as misuse detection. Each detection type has advantages and disadvantages which
controls their usage. While anomaly detection clarifies the environment and early detection and
prevention of further intrusions, it is time consuming to set up and it generates an overwhelming
data. This causes a production of a good number of false positives that the cyber defender needs
to reevaluate or analyze. On the other side, misuse detection is easy to implement, yet it can only
detect known signatures. Hence, it needs continuous updates. Clearly, a combination of the two
systems is needed to optimize both detection and prevention. Machine learning attempt to improve
IDS by enhancing accuracy and efficiency with requiring less of human knowledge. It has contributed successfully to IDS - anomaly detection. The authors in [234] divided machine learning
approaches to IDS to approaches based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) or based on Computational
Intelligence (CI) methods even if the boundary between the two categories may not be even clear.
Of course, many hybrid approaches combine the two approaches. CI approaches include evolutionary computation, fuzzy logic, artificial neural networks, and artificial immune systems. The
authors in [107] classify machine learning techniques used in Anomaly-based intrusion detection
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system (AIDS) to decision trees, Naïve Bayes networks, genetic algorithms, Artificial Neutral Network, fuzzy logic, support vector machines, hidden Markov Model, and K-Nearest Neighbors.
In general, machine learning methods are (1) supervised depending on outputs given labels and
used in training and testing, and (2) unsupervised in which labels are not given and the data is
grouped automatically into different classes using the learning process. The authors in [213] surveyed machine learning and data mining algorithms for cybersecurity to identify threats and classify familiar and unfamiliar entities. Supervised techniques include large sets of labeled data (malware identification, spam detection) and missing labeled data (anomaly detection, risk scoring);
and unsupervised include clustering (entity classification, anomaly detection, data exploration),
association rule leaning (entity classification, anomaly detection, data exploration), and dimensionality reduction [213]. Algorithms need data sets for training and testing. The datasets play an
important role in representation learning algorithms. The authors in [213] included providers of
data sets such as The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Australian Defence
Force Academy (ADFA), Network Forensics and Network Security Monitoring (NetReSec), and
Cyber Research Center (CRC). DARPA has been offering data sets to researchers since 1998. The
Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) offer cybersecurity datasets contain data from Linux
and Windows platforms. These are designed to evaluate the performance of Host-based Intrusion
Detection Systems. The Network Forensics and Network Security Monitoring (NetReSec) is an
independent software vendor that focuses on network security. This vendor maintains a pool of
pcap files and network traces (cyber defense exercises, malware traffics, network forensics, and
packet injection attacks, etc.) that are freely available. This pool provides a useful resource to
perform network evaluations on a cybersecurity system. The Cyber Research Center (CRC) from
the United States military academy offers datasets (Snort intrusion detection logs, Domain Name
Service (DNS) logs, web server logs, and Splunk log server aggregate logs) for public use in cybersecurity research. These datasets provide a mean to match IP addresses from pcap files to IP
addresses in internal networks. The known issue with such data sets is they are old and do not
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include new forms of cyber attacks. Bad actors can also learn from those data sets since they are
publicly available.

Malware Analysis

Malicious software or malware is an effective attack vector that has been widely used. It can be any
code that is designed to infiltrate a computer or damage it. Malware types are virus, botnet, Trojan
horse, worm, ransomware, rootkit, adware, or spyware. They target vulnerabilities in computer
operating system, bad security system design or reckless users. The authors in [19] caution of a
common misunderstanding in classifying malware: “Malware type is assigned according to general
functionality (its goals). Malware is grouped into a malware family according to its particular
functionality (used methods to achieve goals).”
Machine Learning has been used in efforts to combat malware. The taxonomy of machine learning
based techniques in malware detection is shown in Figure 6.2 based on [1].
A support vector machine (SVM) is a discriminate classifier that analyzes data for classification
and regression analysis. So, SVM is a supervised learning technique that takes labeled training data
and divides output into two categories. SVM algorithm looks for a linearly separable hyperplane.
A separating hyperplane divides a group of objects with different class affiliation. Although it is
highly accurate it requires large computational complexity of the construction of the classification
model.
Naïve Bayes (NB) created of model of Bayesian classifier based on Bayes Theorem. The goal of
the classifier is to define the class to which the object belongs. Therefore, the most probable class
for some target object. The maximum a posteriori estimation is sued by NB classifier that most
probable class for a target of interest. Thus, it computes all the probabilities for all known classes,
and the class of the object of interest is in the class with the maximum probability.
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Figure 6.2: Machine learning algorithms to detect malware

Perceptron Algorithm is an old supervised machine learning domain for classification. There are
two types of linear classification and no-linear classification. Linear classification draws groups by
a simple straight line to classify the groups. Whereas if we cannot classify the data set by drawing
a simple straight line then it can be called a non-linear binary classifier. The perceptron learning
algorithm learns a linear discriminant function from the training data drawn from two classes.
Deep neural networks use sophisticated mathematical modeling to cluster and classify data in
complex ways. Neural networks are modeled after human brain to interpret data from sensors. A
deep neural network is a neural network with more than two layers. The artificial neural network
is an interconnected groups of artificial neurons. Deep learning does not require labels to detect
similarities. Modern neural networks search for hidden regularities in the data. Examples of
techniques used in malware are in summarized in Table 6.2.
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Table 6.2: Malware techniques in the literature
Paper

Malware Detection Method

[104]

MalDozer depends on sequences
classification using deep learning
techniques

[147]

Malware
Classification
SimHash and CNN

[19]

[42]

[129]

[131]

using

Used low-level features for multinomial malware classification to
distinguish between 10 malware
families and 10 malware types.
Tested k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN),
RandomForest (RF), Decision
Trees (J48), Support Vector Machines (SVM), Naive Bayes (NB)
and Artificial Neural Network
(ANN)
Transferred
deep-convolutional
generative adversarial network
(tDCGAN)
SVM-based mechanism to detect
malware and normal apps in Android devices. Total 200 benign
programs and 200 a malware sample files.
Anti-interference detection framework based on API that uses the
LSTM model.

Accuracy
Correctly detect with
F1-Score of 96% - 99%
and a false positive rate
of 0.06% - 2%
99.260% at best and
98.862% at average on
a malware dataset of
10,805 samples, fast
1.41 s to recognize new

Accuracy for families:
50,000 features RF
(84.5%). Accuracy for
types: 50,000 features
KNN (66.8%)

95.74% average classification accuracy
Rate of 99% for the
correct identification of
both benign and malware.
Based on local maliciousness has 97.34%
accuracy.

Malware is intentionally made for malicious attacks and it is becoming sophisticated so there is a
need for sophisticated methods to be integrated in intrusion detection systems.
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Challenges of Machine Learning

The Nature of the Problem

Machine learning is a tool that need to be designed to serve its purpose. It is promising but the
nature of cybersecurity makes it difficult. However, it may overcome many difficulties and bring
value if it is well designed [200]. Selecting the appropriate machine learning technique for cybersecurity is a different problem than previous applications. One can acquire a well-designed
machine learning tool by asking several important questions. Maintaining the tool means also
to occasionally ask the questions to make sure the context, environment, and purpose of the tool
remain aligned. The author in [200] state those questions and shown in Figure 6.3:

Figure 6.3: Question for machine learning selection tool
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The questions which help to identify goals to address specific cybersecurity needs and policies,
create information needed for investigation such as prediction or classification, check the applicability of the tool. . check the applicability and transparency of the tool. evaluate the defensive
disposition of the machine learning system. avoid introducing both errors and bias into a machine
learning system when handling sensitive information. plan an evaluation that assesses data sources;
design of the study; appropriate measures of success; understanding the target population; analysis
to explore missing evidence; and the expected generalizability of results. compare multiple types
of tools. You should consider cost of development, maintenance, and operation.
Enterpriser’s network monitoring and protecting includes a great volumes and variety of data.
Defense tools capture and examine logs and traffic among hosts, servers, and other devices.
While big data can be used to enhance security, there is a need to enhance security for big data. This
nature of problem make machine learning task challenging. Reliability and security of machine
learning techniques are crucial to research. Decisive factors vary according to model types and
parameters. The goal is to deal with big data and applications. Authors in [215] discuss that big
data is described by volume, value, veracity, visualization, variety, velocity, viscosity and virality.
Those traits are a challenge when designing machine learning techniques in cyber. In Brief, volume
is the number of data that is generated and needs to be examined. Any enterprise network generates
a volume that keeps increasing with time and coming from different sources. Finding a significance
in the volume is value. There is no doubt that cyber data, for example, network traffic has value
because it will help to detect unusual or unauthorized traffic. We can argue that the value is always
existent, it just depends on the efficiency of the tools used. Veracity is about the quality of captured
data that can vary significantly and influence value. Veracity deals with reliability of data source,
how meaningful it is, and how complete it is. Visualization makes the information easy to read
by the end user. It is still a challenge because of the volume and the velocity in which data is
generated. Visualization needs different methods of representing data. The forms in which data
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comes is variety, as it can be unstructured or structured or complex or semi-structured. Variety
is due to different types domains and repositories. The speed in cyber application could be about
data generation and examined in real time (data in motion) or storing it in databased or logs and
checked later. Viscosity describes latency in the data relative to the cyber event being described. It
measures resistance that comes from different data sources or the difficulty in working with such
volume because of the velocity. Virality is about the rate of speed in which the data is spread.
Those are called the eight Vs in this article, however, many sources online either keep tracking
of the increase number of Vs in data science or debate how many Vs are there? This shows the
challenges that machine learning are constantly facing.

Missing Data

Missing data introduces biases in data observations which may affect classification’s accuracy. The
authors in [162] discuss strategies for handling missing data such as (1) Complete Case Analysis
is common method for machine learning to use. It deletes from the data set observations with
any missing attributes strategy. It may be satisfactory with small amounts of missing data. It can
introduce biased estimates due to the assumptions it makes. (2) Imputation Procedures are also
common approaches for machine learning to use. They deal with missing values as they replace
missing values with some reasonable data or estimated values based on information of data set.
Other approaches are (3) Available Case Analysis keeps all observations but same sample base
changes from attribute to attribute depending on the pattern of missing data. A disadvantage is
that the procedure can cause covariance and correlation matrices not to be positive definite. Naïve
Bayes use this approach and ignores missing. And, (4) Weighting Procedures used mainly is survey
data. It modifies the weights to adjust for non-response as if it were part of the sample design.
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Adversarial Machine Learning

The first challenge is the security of the algorithms that are supposed to watch over the security.
Algorithms are also seen by bad actors as a tool to advance their attacks. Machine learning algorithms are vulnerable and can be targeted by attackers to gain a significant benefit by exploiting
their vulnerabilities. Incidents were already reported against spam filters, antivirus engines, and
autonomous bots.
This issue opened an emerging research to comprehend vulnerabilities of machine learning algorithms and developing robust algorithms. It is called adversarial machine learning. A common
attack in this field is poisoning attack. The taxonomy of security threats towards machine learning
was depicted in [126]. The threats are causative attack or exploratory attack based on classifiers’
influence. Causative means that perpetrators alter training data that algorithms use during retraining. Exploratory attack tries to uncover sensitive information from training data and learning
models. Authors of [186] described machine learning attacks to passive and active. In passive, information about application is stolen which matches exploratory type. In active, the application is
interrupted or corrupted which matches causative. On security perspective, attacks can target CIA
triad (confidentiality, integrity and availability). Attacks may be selective in targets or they can be
indiscriminate. Authors in [216] discuss machine learning techniques vulnerability during training
stage when they are periodic and need retraining. An adversary can craft input data that has similar
feature properties to normal data (e.g., creating a spam message that appears to be non-spam to
the learner), or they exhibit Byzantine behaviors by crafting input data that, when retrained on,
causes the learner to learn an incorrect decision-making function. These sophisticated adversaries
are patient and adapt their behaviors to achieve various goals such as avoiding detection of attacks,
causing classifier disturbance, focused attacks, or searching a classifier to find blind spots in the
algorithm. They showed in their paper how two machine learning methods, SpamBayes and PCA-
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based network anomaly detection, are vulnerable to causative attacks. Causative attacks alter the
training process through influence over the training data. This causative attack poisons learning
algorithm. They also considered other cases and discussed defenses and countermeasures [216].
The authors in [172] found in their taxonomy and survey research that several open problems: (1)
creating immunity to perturbations by increasing robustness with using training algorithm using
modified data. A countermeasure that is useful if the adversary keeps using the same algorithm
for the perturbations. (2) Multiple adversaries is under explored in research. Multiple adversaries
is a likely scenario. (3) Randomized adversarial approach and amount are still open problem. (4)
Digital forensics for adversarial machine learning. How to forensically analyze such attacks while
adhering to the principles of digital evidence?
The integrity of data collection and labelling are often not guaranteed in many applications. For
example, malware s malware samples collected from honeypots or from online services. Defence
techniques against poisoning attacks have been less explored in the research community [167].
They proposed an outlier-detection-based scheme capable to mitigate the effect of optimal poisoning attack strategies.

Conclusion

Machine learning showed us that it is an effective tool that can be used in various areas of information security. Machine learning can improve authentication and protect against phishing and other
attacks. Intrusion detection systems are becoming more efficient because of machine learning integration. IDS needed to tackle the ever changing threats and signature that were not previously
identified. However, there is more research optimize effectiveness vs. spec of detection and reaction. Machine learning in cybersecurity is an interesting topic and further research is needed to
make risks information available quickly, help analysts make better decisions, and ultimately allow
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the system to behave like a biological immune system. How much can machine learning help with
a vulnerable system? It is worth to build systems and infrastructure that are not badly designed, or
should be robust and resilient by design.
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CHAPTER 7: TRUSTWORTHY ROBOTICS IN THE AGE OF
CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES

Introduction

Today’s robotics can be categorized into four groups: robot manipulators, robot vehicles, manrobot systems and biologically inspired robots [196]. Robot manipulator is an industrial robot
comprised of robotic arm and body. It needs a power supply and controller to function. Robotic
vehicles are unmanned vehicles. Man-robot systems include haptic robotics that can have experience of touch by applying forces, vibrations, or motions; telemanpulator or remote manipulator; and exoskeleton robot that are tandem wearable devices unlike autonomous robots that work
independently. Bio-inspired robotic is applied, for instance, in biomechanics’ concepts learned
from nature to improve their designs. Although the alarms of cyber attacks against robots are not
sounded as high as they should, the threat is imminent and it is a matter of time for more stories
of malicious attacks are to be uncovered. The probability of exploiting robotics vulnerabilities is
not null because their systems consist of firmware, operating system, hardware, software, points of
access and control, networks, etc. All those components have been a targets for cyber attacks. In
fact, many operating systems are in open sources and can be traced down by hacking techniques
such as reconnaissance and scanning. Hence, future challenges for robotics’ cybersecurity need
more research. Those challenges are tangled with cybersecurity’s own problems since it is an ever
evolving discipline. Hence, one needs to understand both robotics and cybersecurity by building
cyber programs and policies.
Cybersecurity combines a set of strategies and systems to defend and protect confidentiality, integrity and availability of data, systems and services. It is complex because it consists of various
elements and layers such as networks, systems, people, privacy, etc. Today’s necessity for systems
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and data to be available digitally and to be accessible online or remotely increases bad actors’
persistent attempts to breach them. Hence, robotics must define it’s own security perimeters and
boundary defenses. Both cybersecurity and robotics are interested in machine learning and artificial intelligence to capitalize on promises in fields such pattern recognition, computer vision,
image identification, intrusion detection system, etc. Although machine learning and artificial intelligence techniques may not be silver bullets in improving both robotics and cybersecurity they
are becoming essential to improve both of them. While authentication has been improved in computer systems, some robotics are still behind in authentication schemes. In fact, many machines
keep default user and password for credentials, and often the user does not change them or cannot
change them. A grave vulnerability that makes unauthorized access easy as a hacker only needs
to know the maker to figure out the credentials. Attackers’ motives to compromise robotics are
numerous and Little research is conducted in this field.

Trustworthiness of robotics should be researched in the age of cybersecurity. In general, although
many enterprises discuss security as a primary focus often security is applied as a secondary task
because they are concerned with costs, and developers of systems target the stakeholders’ needs
prior to considering integration of security into an architecture design [132]. Accounting for vulnerabilities require for the enterprise to hire personnel to perform ethical hacking and provide
recommendations on types of vulnerabilities. The additional cost of hiring and fixing those vulnerabilities are not often included in the budget or could make their services or products more
expensive. An example to discuss is the swift rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) that was due to
low cost devices that can be connected to internet and perform convenient functions. The reality
of lack of security surfaced after horrific news of hackers taking over those devices. Surveillance
cameras that are supposed to add to security and safety of households were exploited to spy and
frighten children in their own bedrooms. Another example is mentioned in an article by CNN in
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which which it was reported that researchers at security firm IOActive have successfully conducted
a ransomware attack on a SoftBank Robotics NAO humanoid robot. Those NAO robots are used
in classrooms, retail stores, and offices. Cesar Cerrudo, CTO at IOActive said:

Robots are IoT on steroids.

He continues to state that ransomware can directly affects production of businesses [114]. Ransomware is a malicious attack that locks users or hijacks data and demands a ransom to be paid in
order to gain back access to system or data. Ransom is usually asked in form of Bitcoin. A digital
currency that can be accepted globally without having attackers reveal their identities [132]. The
cyber risks are not limited to ransomeware and spying, they also include malicious acts of theft
which is used in unmanned vehicles to harm assets or people or terror, etc. Hackers targeted insecure autonomous vehicles’ network and were able to take control of the car and disable breaking
system or increase its speed.

Trustworthy Robotics Requirements

The rise and the uncovering of cyber incidents can only lead to a decrease in robotics’ trust. Per
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, trust is one in which a confidence is placed. So from the cybersecurity perspective, what is the plan in which this confidence is measured? Trust comes with a
belief that robotics will deliver exactly the tasks needed to meet today’s challenges. Authors of
[192] discuss trust as a primary reason for acceptance, and state many points about developing and
maintaining trust in artificial intelligence. One of them is security and privacy protection as people
are unlikely to trust anything that is too risky to operate. Data security is another trust issue as
machine learning is going to be a player in advancing robotics and performing adaptive tasks. For
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example, robots are to reach certain degrees of autonomy in the 2050 battlefield as many will be
unattended ground sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, and fire-and forget missiles [110]. They will
act remotely to identify targets, analyze data and adapt to the field which makes their commands
and control a challenge due to cyber attackers.

For clarity, we explain our definition of robotics with respect to improving cybersecurity trustworthiness degree. We do not limit the definition to the machine that is supposed to replace human or
work with human, or to the science/engineering behind it, or whether it is a service or medical or
an autonomous agent. We define robotics based on cybersecurity points discussed above as

Robotics is everything and everyone that is involved during a the life cycle of robotics’
products.

Figure 7.1 depicts those components. It is worth noting that the term robotics was introduced by
Asimov as the science devoted to the study of robots [81]. This science was founded on three laws:
(1) A robot should not injure or foul play a person. (2) A robot must carry out human’s orders,
except if there is a conflict with first law. and (3) A robot must assure it’s own survival, as long
as such security does not conflict with the two laws. It is likely a misunderstanding can result
from a misconception that both cybersecurity and robotics are about technology. Figure 7.1 shows
that human or people are going to be essential in increasing trustworthiness. Human is involved at
many stages as the designer, the maker and the user. Consequently, combining both the proposed
definition and Asimov robotics’ definition, we have the following:

The expected outcome from trustworthy robotics is measured by mitigating cyber risks
in order to avoid harming human beings, obeying intended orders that don’t harm
human beings and survive own missions.
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Figure 7.1: Adopted robotics’ definition for a cybersecurity requirements

Trustworthy plan can be difficult to build information systems that are difficult or expensive to
build. Yet, it cannot be avoided because it can be reasonably done. And also some risks can have
catastrophic impact. The level of necessary trustworthiness decides the minimum of acceptable
risks in which a system or a product or a process remain robust and withstands cyber threats. Figure 7.2 summarizes the proposed plan to increase trustworthiness of robotics. It includes discussed
policies, a risk management framework and a cybersecurity program. It shows that those components are essential to meet requirements and challenges, and they need to be tailored. They allow
to have a process of managing risks that are not limited to technology. Frameworks assist in working the details such as the appropriate security controls and categorization of information systems.
The link of nodes indicates that alignment is the key for success.
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Figure 7.2: Trustworthy cybersecurity requirements

Cybersecurity Policies

Many policies can be implemented depending on cyber risks and types of products and services
that are provided. Overall, let’s start with a policy document by the Department of Defense (DoD)
called Cybersecurity Procedures Instruction, DoDI 8500.01, that changed from information assurance (IA) to cybersecurity [52]. The goal from it is to protect and defend the Department
of Defense or DoD information and Information Technology (IT) from prospective cybersecurity
threats. Thus, trustworthy robotics need responsive policies that meet the changes over time and
mitigate the risks associated with vulnerabilities by considering the threats from the insider and
other hackers. Those represent the human aspect of cybersecurity. Insiders (or internals) are driven
by many motives such as revenge or financial benefits [132]. An insider act could be unintentional
or intentional or a malicious act, so a user’s proper cyber behavior policy is needed. For example,
Ransomware Risk Policy for detailing awareness and education. It also outlines escalation procedures for offenders. Security by obscurity is no longer a strategy to mitigate the risks. Policies
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should include Ransomeware Risks Policy Personnel Training with awareness programs. People
building robotics or handling robotics or using robotics should receive training that is educational
and helpful for robotics to be robust and resilient so that worthiness is increased.trust is in creased.
Policies attempt to identify trustworthy resources of information, attempts to make cybersecurity
fully integrated into the systems and products, and interoperability is adheres to the proposed controls in the architecture. Policies include cyberspace defense tactics and tools that are employed
to protect, detect, characterize, counter, and mitigate unauthorized activities and vulnerabilities.
For instance, identify tested access-control whitelists, protocol based whitelists, behavior based
rules, and audit of authorized personnel activities. Policies should consider performance of implementation of cybersecurity, classification of information, and should address the identification
procedures and credentials to eliminate anonymity. Policies address information technology and
cybersecurity workforce and the mission of partners or contractors. Policies should include Audit
Strategies and an Incident Response Policy and a Contingency Plan. Incident response includes
response handling and decision making during an unfortunate breach. Incident response policy
intend to protect humans, machines and plan necessary resources for responses. Incident response
policy assigns clear tasks and responsibilities to respond team members (security technician or engineer, incident investigator or coordinator, security manager, chief security officer, etc.). A simple
issue that this policy is going to resolve is defining which incident types deserves to activate the
team for. Insider crimes or sabotage are difficult to deal with, so cyber incident team need to identify potential abuse and sabotage case and prepare a plan for response and take control of damages.
As far as Audit Policy, it can connect discussed risks’ assessments with management plan and
provide a regular review for risk analysis. Baselines for audit are described in risk management
framework. It could also recommend ethical hacking or penetration testing to discover vulnerabilities. Two main concerns with robots are (1) who has access to them? and (2) who may misuse
them? The issue of access is important to audit. Policies for dealing with third-party vendors are
necessary because cyber breaches could initiate with a third party vendor. Hence, one should ask,
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what is the ability of a third party vendor or contractor to obey security rules and requirements?
Policies set up the guideline and the rules in which the program and the framework are going
to be implemented and revised. Hence, there is a need for risks identification and management
framework to be completed, including impact levels and probabilities of cyber incidents, connecting cyber program objectives with risks’ assessments and management. In summary, Robotics’
provider should decide the ideal way of establishing policies. The main goal of policies is to
increase trustworthiness and we suggest some main questions while drafting these policies: (1)
Which assets or stakeholder to protect? What are they going to be protected from? What are the
probabilities of cyber threats? What measures to take to protect assets and people while keeping
cost reasonable? How to quantify security checks? How to audit and improve programs? Policies
must be actionable and enforceable. So drafting policies that cannot be executable is going to diminish the trust of stakeholders. Policies cannot skip any one of the areas which we outlined in the
definition in Figure 7.1. For example, Access Policy addresses access and permissions. Authentication Policy is about credentials and the use of biometrics or double authentication to gain access
to a machine or a system or data. Since encryption is an area in which robotics’ communications
and data storing need improvement, below is Figure 7.3 with a simple outline for an Encryption
Policy [183] .
The Purpose specifies the direction in which a policy applies. For example, where encryption is
we ought to determine what encryption techniques are going to provide the most security for those
applications. The Scope identifies to whom the policy applies. Section about policy explains the
details of Purpose and Scope and standards or laws that apply or relevant. Enforcement explains the
consequences that can be faced by persons who do not comply with policy . Definitions remove
ambiguities and misunderstanding of policy. Revision history keeps track of changes, team or
members who made the changes and the dates. Signatures on the policy indicates approval and the
policy is executed by the chief executive office and/or chief security officer.
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Figure 7.3: Sample of a policy outline

Cybersecurity Program

To establish trustworthy robotics in the age of cybersecurity challenges one has to first understand
today’s cyber risks and create an effective cybersecurity program to mitigate them. Figure 7.4
shows an example of a high-level cybersecurity program cycle modified based on the work of
[53] on enterprises. The trustworthy program manages robotics’ risks by deploying mitigating
controls and capabilities. So, it assesses the effectiveness of security that is currently integrated.
It makes improvements after these assessments of risks by planning improvements to technology,
software, training, and processes. It checks security of all components’ capabilities. It applies
those capabilities to address specific concerns, prevention and detection of any behavior that is of
interest. It operates cybersecurity technologies, processes, capabilities, and controls. It assesses
operations by measuring cybersecurity performance to understand types of threats and robustness
of defenses against those threats. It reports a status of used frameworks and standards to robotics’
stakeholders (builders, regulators, insurers, etc.).
Based on [44], robots are a kind of embedded system and can be susceptible to the same types of
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Figure 7.4: Robotics high Level cybersecurity program cycle

cyber attacks that embedded systems face such as hardware attacks, firmware or Operating System
attacks, and application attacks. Every system processes information, stores it and transmits it
so it can be a hackers’ target with respect of confidentiality, integrity and availability. Robots as
embedded system can be a victim of losses due confidentiality threat or data theft, integrity threat
or data altering and it includes hijacking or tarnish of organization image, and denial of access
attacks, and or a combination of those losses 7.5. Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability are
known as CIA triad. Their security objectives are not limited to the machines or robots.
Research in this area remains weak and does not study profiles of cyber attackers in order to prepare for random attacks or hacktivists or organized crime, or espionage, or theft, etc. The authors
in [57] discussed cyber risk scenarios and abuse of privileged access. Abuse of privileged access
can be accomplished by an insider or an attacker from outside. This is the human aspect in robotics
definition that we adopted. Abuse can disclose of sensitive data by human error or planted bots, by
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Figure 7.5: Losses caused by cyber attacks

security vulnerabilities due to existing vulnerabilities in software or unencrypted transmission of
data, and denial of service due to a bot executing rapid sequences or an outage. Authors also suggested that in order to secure robotic process automation (RPA) one should address those controls:
Establish a governance framework with roles and responsibilities for securing robotics; perform
software and product security analysis; manage digital identity and access; conduct compliance
analysis to data identification and protection; and to conduct security operations such as audit log
activities and vulnerabilities scanning [57].
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Risk Management Framework

To take an inventory of the system risks while building the cybersecurity program other frameworks
can be considered. For instance, to tailor Risk Management Framework (RMF) by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the special publication 800-12 [149]. This RMF
publication provides a high-level overview of information security principles by introducing related
concepts and the security control families that organizations can leverage to effectively secure their
systems and information. It provides a basic foundation of concepts and ideas to any person tasked
with or interested in understanding how to secure systems in Figure 7.6.

Figure 7.6: Risk management framework, based on [145]

The RMF in [145] categorizes the system and the information is processed, stored, and transmitted
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by that system based on an impact analysis. It selects controls for an initial set of baseline security
controls. This categorization step informs about impact levels on CIA triad security objectives.
They are summarized in Figure 7.7 and they are based on FIPS 199 publication [143]. Therefore,
there is a need to identify the impact of a risk on each CIA triad security objective.

Figure 7.7: Potential impact for CIA triad, based on [143]

Afterwards, it requires to select security controls based on the categorization and the selection of
impact levels. Guidance on security controls can be found in [144]. Then it requires to implement
security controls in the third step and describe how the controls are employed within the system
and its environment of operation. Assessment is the fourth step that ensures that the organization assesses the security controls using appropriate assessment procedures and to determine the
extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended. Authorization is
the fifth step in which a senior manager officially authorizes a system to operate or continue to
operate based on the results of a complete and thorough security control assessment. This decision is based on a determination of the risk from previous steps and the decision that this risk is
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acceptable. Monitoring is the sixth step of the RMF to continuously monitor the security controls
in the system to ensure that they are effective over time as changes occur in the system and the
environment in which the system operates. Risk Management could be complex, multifaceted undertaking that requires the involvement of the entire organization, from senior leaders planning to
engineers, technicians and support staff. Cybersecurity risk management is a subset of the overall
risk management (i.e. ISO 31000) that the enterprise is going to implement. To generalize, we
propose to check several NIST SP 800 and NIST SP 1800 versions, International Organization
for Standardization (ISO/IEC 27000) [99], the SANS Top 20 Critical Security Controls [73], FIPS
199, etc.

Unmanned Ariel Vehicles Case

Background

Unmanned Ariel vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly used for civil and military applications. UAVs
may maneuver autonomously or they can rely on on-board computers or they can be remotely controlled from ground stations by pilots. Many incidents concerning UAVs have been reported by
the news agencies. The integration of UAVs in military missions was accompanied by accidents
having a broader impact on the overall security of UAVs. The U.S. military increased its investment in the research and production of UAVs from 2.3 billion in 2008 to 4.2 billion in 2012 [90].
Military drones are on the rise because they are cheaper than military jets to operate and fly for
longer hours. UAVs current operations are various such as border surveillance, reconnaissance,
transport and armed attacks. UAVs are seen as reliable and can help improve national security.
They are automated and autonomous machines. Research considering security status of UAVs is
increasing as more of clients question their trust in those UAVs fulfilling missions. In December
2009, the Wall Street Journal reported that a $ 26 SkyGrabber software was used by insurgents to
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hack into video feeds from Predator drones and access raw videos [79]. In October 2011, many
websites reported that a computer virus called keylogger infected the cockpits of U.S. Predator and
Reaper drones [189]. Virus allows logging pilots’ keystrokes as they remotely fly missions. Another interesting incident was the claimed hijacking of a U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel by Iranian forces.
It is widely accepted that Iranian forces were able to hijack that drone. Many news agencies reported that Iranians claimed that they reversed engineered the drone and its clone took flight in
2012. Although the circumstances under which RQ-170 came into the possession of the Iranian
forces are controversial, the incident brings the important security question: What can be done to
avoid similar incidents? Some of the researched defense tactics against cyber attacks [177] are,
1) encryption with encoding of data that allows access only to legitimate users, 2) mechanisms to
prevent distributed denial of service (DDoS), and 3) intrusion detection system (IDS) that scans
for anomalies in the system. The system security depends on the exploitation of existing vulnerabilities and the hardening of the system. Hence, it is important that the system designer discovers
vulnerabilities before the attacker. A continuous risk analysis process is necessary to achieve this
practice action. However, such risk management or assessment scheme for UAVs is still sketchy or
non-existent. In addition, the known incidents concerning UAVs indicate that the risk assessments
are deficient.
A close examination of the data flow in the UAVs autopilot system [108], demonstrates that several
general cyber attacks can be categorized into hardware attack (gain access to the UAV autopilot
components directly), wireless attack (attack through one of the wireless communication channels), and sensor spoofing (pass false data through the on-board sensors of the UAV autopilot). In
2011, Tippenhauer et al published one of the first widely distributed guides on how to successfully
spoof the GPS on a UAV titled On the Requirements for Successful GPS Spoofing Attacks. This
detailed study laid out actions to successfully GPS spoof military or civilian UAVs. The document
had the potential to be a guide for hacking, but a key fact often lost in the conversation of the study
is the proposed countermeasures to prevent GPS spoofing [208]. Kim et al accept the fact that
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technology has allowed UAVs to be hacked and seeks to explore protective measure to combat this
technique [108]. The study highlights two key points of developing cyber attack detection. The
first point is an algorithm to detect and isolate potential cyber attacks. The second key-point is the
development of an additional layer of security, known as the supervisor, to protect the auto pilot
system in the event of an attack. Rani et al furthers the research by defining the hacking methods such as Password theft, Wireshark, Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks, Trojan horse virus,
Distributed Denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Once the hacking attacks are defined, the research
explores the concept of trust in the system as a means to defend against hacking. The experiment
concludes with a real world hack against a parrot drone [177]. Abbaspour et al explore a fault data
injection on a UAV with the defense of an adaptive neural network. During their research, fault
data penetrates a UAV and attacks the UAV sensors systems. In their experiments, fault data could
be unusual environmental data or external data packets that collide with legitimate data packets.
The adaptive neural network (ANN) in the simulations showed results that the ANN successfully
detect the attacks in the sensors. Once detected, the information can be used to correct itself [2].

UAV Cyber Risks

The UAV operations control center (GCS) is the link between UAV and satellite. The GCS controls
launch, flight, recovery, payload operations and processing of communications and data. The GCS
station protects the UAV from cyber-attack threats and physical destruction. The data link is a
key subsystem for any UAV. It provides the two way communication. The satellite is the outside
world link between the GCS and the UAV, provides the UAV and GCS the global positioning
system (GPS) location coordinates for the UAV [210]. The network consist of components, their
attributes, individual and collective behaviors and interactions. The unit’s mission and size of the
area of operations determines the UAVs maximum range. A UAV can play a role of a mission UAV
or a relay UAV.
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The types of cyber attacks on UAVs can be

• Hardware Attack: Attacker has access to the UAV autopilot components directly.
• Wireless Attack: Attacker carries out the attacks through one of the wireless communication
channels.
• Sensor Spoofing: Attacker passes false data through the on-board sensors of the UAV autopilot.

Based on CIA triad, Figure 7.8 shows examples of attacks on a UAV, modifed based on the work
in [100]
As it can be seen that jamming is a major risk for UAVs and it can affect availability and integrity.
One way to initiate jamming is the use of electromagnetic energy or noise to override GPS signals
that UAV is using. A perpetrator can have jammers that can affect the frequency of communication
between UAV and GCS or satellite. Based on discussed RMF, both availability and integrity are
identified as risks that could have a adverse effect on mission of UAV, and if they are not mitigated
the UAV could be hijacked or lost. This is a vulnerability that can be identified and score its
impact in the RMF and inform the cybersecurity program to plan requirements that mitigate the
risks. A research is growing in this field of creating testbeds to simulate cyber attacks on UAVs and
learn lessons from them. The results of the categorization and assessment decide types of security
control to integrate. Example of controls: system specifications, system software, spectrum of
electromagnetic, bandwidth requirements, autonomous program, Shadow configuration, encrypted
transmission. Finally, this case shows that one overall issue that many industries need to make sure
that policies, programs and risks management are aligned.
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Figure 7.8: UAV cyber risks with respect to CIA triad, based on [100]

Power Grid Case

The threat of cyber-attacks is expanding and intensifying due to many reasons like the vulnerability
of industries, the denial of such vulnerabilities, the lack of reporting (or even detecting), and the
inconsistency of the regulatory framework among states and countries. In this case, a cyber attack
on Ukrainian power grid that is occurred on December 23, 2015, starting at approximately 3:35
p.m local time, is discussed. It disconnected seven 110 kV and lower (23kV, 35 kV) substations for
three hours. The purpose of considering this case stems from the fact that this case is an illustration
to show how vulnerable the power grid can be; and to show the high impact it had on a a grid that
was not as automated as current smart grids. Unauthorized access can be done by compromising a
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robotic component or the user. So, building trustworthy robotics includes the human aspect of the
security. This case is an example of the threats on a critical infrastructure that a large population
depends on. Such attack is no longer theoretical and has the potential to be extremely dangerous. A
descriptive detail surrounding this attack helps to offer lessons learned and recommend mitigation
approaches to deter similar attacks. On December 24, 2015, a Ukrainian news outlet called TSN
reported that due to a hacker attack half of the Ivano-Frankivsk Region lost power. Afterwards,
many reporting agencies and independent bloggers followed up on the on the TSN initial report.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a formal report on February 25, 2016.
That report showed that the attacks were coordinated and excused within 30 minutes of each other,
and they impacted 225,000 customers. Ukrainian government officials claimed the outages were
caused by a cyber-attack, and that Russian security services were responsible for the incidents.
The Ukrainian government worked closely with the U.S. investigation team consisting of the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC)/Industrial Control Systems
Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (USCERT), the Department of Energy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the North American
Electric Reliability Corporation, shared information to help prevent similar cyber-attacks. Through
investigation (ICS-CERT, 2016), the team learned that power outages were caused by remote cyber intrusions at three regional electric power distribution companies (Oblenergos) impacting about
225,000 customers. The power system process consists of several stages from power generation,
to its transmission and distribution to consumers. The computerized nodes are mainly in power
generation, substation and dispatch center. The strained substations are 110kV and 35kV substations which are closer to the consumer. The substation automation systems are open loop control
or depend on manual monitoring that uses telemetry, remote communication, remote control, and
remote adjustment. The substation automation systems belong to the human monitoring-based
SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition system). For 110kV and 35kV substations,
the monitoring systems usually use a Windows operating system. SCADA system is a computer155

based process control and dispatch automation system.
The attacks can be in different forms to cause power outages through SCADA [12]. For example, (1) control the operation of circuit breakers and the knife switch to directly cut the power;
and (2) modify the equipment operating parameter that causes a breaker tripping. It is believed
that the attacker utilized spear phishing or social engineering. BlackEnergy is planted, a standpoint is built via BlackEnergy, and then the attacker starts lateral penetration and took control of
the critical host of monitoring. BlackEnergy implanted adequately botnets. After gaining control of SCADA, the attacker delivers certain commands to turn off power, then hard erase drives
(killdisk) to make the system unable to reboot. The other side of the attack was a telephone distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against the customer service center of the substation to
prevent customers from reporting the outage. Perpetrators created custom malware that shut down
the power grid distribution substations. In addition, the attackers targeted the call center for the
Ukrainian electricity-distribution firm Kyivoblenergo, to prevent customers to report outages. The
synchronized remote cyber attacks were successful in maliciously operate a SCADA system to
cause power outages. The investigators mentioned that nothing about the attack in the Ukraine
was inherently specific to Ukrainian infrastructure . The following Table 7.1 summarizes lessons
learned and possible solutions to mitigate the risk (based on [115].
Consequently, attacking infrastructure of any country is no longer a theoretical idea. The thought
that is alarming and expresses the importance of developing mitigation and exercising contingency
plans to prevent a bad day from turning to a disastrous one. Finally, the motive and sophistication
of this power grid attack is consistent with the activities of a highly structured and resourced hacker.
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Table 7.1: Lessons learned and mitigation
Ukraine Attack
Malicious email

Future Attack
Social engineering

Credential Theft

BlackEnergy 3,
keystroke loggers

Remote access attacks

VPN Access

VPN
through
network

Sniff or hijack
VPN connection

Workstation Remote Access

Remote access

Control and Operate

Used Human Machine Interface
(HMI)

Respond and Restore

Well planned and
highly
coordinated attacks

Spear phishing

access
trusted

Modify
attack
approaches
to
tunnel
communications
over authorized
perimeter firewall
communications
Injection control
commands

Differ to throw
off or defeat the
defender’s plans.

Viable Solutions
Use of sandboxing
technology,
proxy
systems and limiting
workstations.
Monitor network and
system communication.
Identify abnormalities.
Implement alarm capabilities.
Use two-factor authentication.
Limit time
of use and disconnect
paths after a period of
time.
Proper architecture to
control remote connections.

Be able to inhibit automated control and activate manual operations
only.
Defenders exercise and
train against different
scenarios.

Conclusion

A neutral plan to establish trustworthy robotics in the age of cybersecurity challenges is articulated. It is neutral because it provides guidance that can be adopted by any robotics provider or
builder. The details of the plan have to do with the specific industry. It depends on establishing
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a policy, a program and a framework that are dynamic and iterative to meet both the needs of
the stakeholders and the risks. A case of UAV was briefly discussed to show that any product of
robotics can be affected by cyber attacks because any type is a sort of an embedded system and
have vulnerabilities. The research of cybersecurity application in robotics is not adequate and most
likely that wrong assumptions are still considered. For example, robots are resilient as advanced
levels of technological machines. In reality, most of robots use robots operating systems that are
open source and known to many, and robots do not stand alone and require communication or other
points of communication. Robotics strive to use artificial intelligence (AI) to improve functions
such as image detection and sensing, however, AI is also vulnerable to adversary attacks. If we
do not address cybersecurity problems seriously while deploying robotics we are setting a game
in which outcomes are not known. When an autonomous vehicle strikes a pedestrian, is it passenger’s fault? Is it system’s fault? Is it environment’s or road’s fault? Or was the car hijacked? The
latter represents a dimension that is not widely considered as providers focus on improving sensors
and rushing to dominate a market. In future work, we plan to address in details connectivity and
alignments of cybersecurity programs, policies and risks frameworks. Also, we will provide scenarios in industrial cybersecurity organization. Moreover, we will provide insights on behavioral
Anomaly Detection Methods and controls.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Predicting total security at a given time is still a challenging task. ICRC addressed vulnerability
assessment and pointed to the challenges of scalability of used methods while analysing networks’
vulnerabilities. There is not enough work done in studying all possible staged attacks and determining security measures that need to be deployed. The problem is enterprises may not see or
figure o ut t heir r eturn o n i nvestment ( ROI) t hat c alculates t he r atio o f b enefits of cybersecurity
programs over costs of these investments. ROI should include many of the ideas we discussed for
instance Cyber Situational Awareness in Chapter 4. Because of lack of relationships between cyber
defense teams in different organizations which have fallen in the hands of adverse agents show that
some companies are spending more on cyber defense but in areas that may not maximize security.
The adopted definition o f r esilience c yberspace c onsists o f t hree m ain g oals t o a ccomplish: (1)
Withstand attacks on CIA triad; (2) adapt to adverse and ever changing threats; and (3) recover
and maintain survivability. In other words, the ability to detect in a timely manner the threats from
inside or outside security perimeters; to stand up to those threats effectively, and to respond to
incidents while maintaining productivity. Figure 8.1 depicts that ICRC can achieve this resilience
by deploying its components over the three layers of cyberspace. Those layers are found in [72]:
(1) The physical network component is comprised of the hardware, systems software, and infrastructure; (2) the logical network layer comprises of those elements of the network that are related
to one another in a way that is abstracted from the physical network; and (3) the cyber-persona
layer consists of the people actually on the network.
Future research should explore the effects of social, behavioral, environment. Also, aspects which
deals with biases, perceptions, deterrence, intent, attitude, norms, alternatives, sanctions, decision
making, etc. on the security. In Chapter 2, a conceptual framework that is interdisciplinary was
proposed to bring together behavioral cybersecurity, human factors and modeling and simulation.
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Figure 8.1: Integrating ICRC over cyberspace to achieve resilience

Cyber teams should be involved in research to make sure that models work the way they are intended in reality. Encryption for logical access control and securing communications is necessary.
Cyber teams should assess the need and follow an adaptive approach in which level of encryption
depends on classification of data stored or transferred. One should not adopt proprietary encryption that does not meet rigorous standards and withstand brute force attack or other attacks. For
future work, we will (1) analyze cryptography requirements in security tools such as VPN communication, firewalls, etc.; (2) provide research on cryptography management (types, standards,
policies, certificates, keys managements, etc.). As shown in Chapter 3, encryption key length is
not the only factor in having secure encryption because several other types of attacks are used, so
cyber individuals or teams need to consider type of ciphers that are implemented.
ICRC encourages cyber professionals to explore research in game theory with respect to cybersecurity to better understand the strategies, costs and payoffs of different strategies. It should strengthen
the decision making. In Chapter 5 a problem of a network security game when the defender has
incomplete information about the attacker’s action profile was solved. The defender keeps on up160

dating own belief in the form of policy profile so that, based on the policy profile, the defender
decides whether to activate network defense resources. The studied algorithm works better than
other algorithms which solve such incomplete information game between the rational agents. The
numerical analysis of this algorithm shows that it converges. For future work, scenarios in which
multiple types of attacks happen from a single attacker or multiple attackers will be studied. Another interesting area for research in the future is the deception games and allow system defenses
to automatically implement predictive strategies using machine learning and artificial intelligence.
In reality, hackers do not always use same techniques, so one has to have an adaptive strategy that
is dynamic. Therefore, a good understanding of game theory will help in decision making to win
or reach an equilibrium in which an attacker is not attempting attacks, or not successful. This
idea interconnects with future work from Chapter 4. There is a need to use decoys or honepots to
deceive an attacker who is scanning a network, or to identify a potential insider who is accessing
unauthorized data. Moreover, to study in the future the interactions between outside hacker or
insider with a decoy and learn how their reactions can change when their moves are discovered.
ICRC addressed the opportunities and challenges of machine learning in cybersecurity. Machine
learning showed that it is an effective tool and it can be implemented in many areas of information
security. Machine learning can improve authentication and protect against phishing and other attacks. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are becoming more efficient because of machine learning
integration. IDS needed to tackle the ever changing threats and signature that were not previously
identified. However, there is still work to do to optimize effectiveness of detection and reaction.
The future work of interest is to create ontologies to deal with cyber insider threats. Those ontologies represent specialized domain knowledge and they are going to be simpler than the current
existing ontologies. The goal is to make them efficient to identify a potential insider and deploy
other security measures such as intervention or awareness programs. Often, insider incidents look
trivial after they occur and people wonder, how come they happened? A simple answer is security
is overlooked.
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The last component in ICRC deals with cybersecurity trustworthiness. An example of robotics was
studied and a special case of UAVs was discussed to show that any product of robotics can be affected by cyber attacks. The available research on cybersecurity which has application in robotics
is not adequate and most likely that wrong assumptions are still being used. For example, robots
are resilient as advanced levels of technological machines. In reality, many robots use robots operating systems (ROS) that are open source and known to many, and it is worth noting that robots
do not stand alone and require communication or other points of communication. The main issue
that was discovered is the lack of an alignment among risk management framework, policies and
cybersecurity programs. Therefore, the controls and requirements may be existing but not used
properly or effectively. This issue could be the problems with cybersecurity measurements when
an enterprise attempts to score itself.
Another area in future work is that currently the work is quantifying mitigation of insider threat
by using human factors and Object Measurement (OM) [53] that consists of six steps: (1) Define
the questions, (2) Select appropriate measurement for measurement, (3) Define characteristics to
measure for each object, (4) Create a value scale for each characteristic, (5) measure each object
characteristic, and (6) calculate the overall index. We propose to examine them and scrutinize the
underlying assumptions to decide if they still are applicable. We may need to update them based on
currently available instruments for defense and currently available knowledge of machine learning
and artificial intelligence.
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